Suchergebnisse

AbstractWe offer evidence that public sector corruption has an inverse association with evaluations of performance at both the local and central government levels. Consistent with ex ante expectations, perceptions of corruption among local government officials are directly and negatively related to performance evaluations at the local government level and relatively less so at the central government level. Conversely, perceptions of corruption among overall government officials have a stronger negative association with performance evaluations of central governments relative to performance evaluations of local governments. These results confirm that individual evaluations of public sector corruption affect perceived government performance evaluations, with local–local, local–central, central–local, and central–central level variances. Regressions by country groups—such as European Union membership, or geographic clusters, such as Southeastern Balkan or the former Soviet Union states—continue to support the core findings with one caveat. Results from two‐level random intercepts and slopes regression models show that the negative association between perceived corruption and government performance evaluation is weaker in contexts with relatively higher levels of public corruption.

This article demonstrates the impact of public officials' corruption on the size and allocation of U.S. state spending. Extending two theories of "excessive" government expansion, the authors argue that public officials' corruption should cause state spending to be artificially elevated. Corruption increased state spending over the period 1997–2008. During that time, the 10 most corrupt states could have reduced their total annual expenditure by an average of $1,308 per capita—5.2 percent of the mean per capita state expenditure—if corruption had been at the average level of the states. Moreover, at the expense of social sectors, corruption is likely to distort states' public resource allocations in favor of higher‐potential "bribe‐generating" spending and items directly beneficial to public officials, such as capital, construction, highways, borrowing, and total salaries and wages. The authors use an objective, concrete, and consistent measurement of corruption, the number of convictions.

Few studies have linked public corruption to the quality of public infrastructure, particularly in developed countries. This article examines how public corruption affects the quality of transportation infrastructure in the context of the US states. Using state panel data for the period from 2002 to 2008, we found that public corruption had a negative impact on the quality of state roads, as captured by the International Roughness Index and overall road condition scores. This study concludes that the prevention of corruption is crucial to improving infrastructure quality and suggests preventive policy tools. Points for practitioners Transportation is one of the more corruption-prone sectors. This sector allows public officials discretion, attracts rent-seeking activities, and conceals malfeasance through secretive transactions. Our study finds that public corruption diminishes the quality of transportation infrastructure. Strengthening good governance is a critical way to improve public infrastructure performance. A variety of key anti-corruption strategies and actions are worth pursuing in the context of infrastructure development.

Although the development of punctuated equilibrium theory makes broad reference to the bureaucratic procedures that regulate budgetary decision making and makes reasonable assumptions about the influence of those procedures on the dynamic of resource allocation, little is known about how the specific mechanisms work. This has led to a call to understand the processes that cause friction in greater detail. This study examines how budgetary output patterns may be influenced by governments' strategic fiscal choices. Using an approach that highlights the roles of various fiscal policy‐making processes, we found significant deviations of budgetary output patterns in capital projects, restricted funds, and entitlement spending, thus signifying the influence of fiscal practices on resource allocation decisions. We further examined how fiscal influences may be realized in the political process of democratization in Hong Kong. By examining legislative filibuster cases related to capital projects, we found evidence associating democratization with greater institutional friction and consequently with larger budgetary output punctuations.

Unfunded public pension obligations represent a great challenge for policy makers in the American states. We posit that a part of pension underfunding relates to the level of public corruption. Empirical findings in the article show that funding ratios in public pension funds are inversely related to the incidence levels of corruption in the state, with other fiscal, political, and institutional covariates held constant. We show that this can happen through higher pension benefits, lower actuarially required contributions (ARCs), lower percentage of actual ARC contributions, and poorer investment outcomes. Based on empirical estimates, we find that a reduction of corruption by one standard deviation around the mean would permit the states to save on pension benefits by 10.24% annually (or US$1,894.64 per recipient), increase required ARC by 4.40%, increase actual ARC contributions by 8.46%, and improve investment returns by 4.72%. Therefore, policies to reduce public-sector corruption, or to improve the insulation of pension funds in relatively more corrupt environments, can make a significant contribution toward tackling the public pension underfunding crisis in the American states.