Suchergebnisse

The energy crisis experienced by the European Union and representing a serious non-military threat to its security has not bypassed Spain. This is a country with a high degree of dependence on hydrocarbon imports. However, the energy crisis there has a number of specific features. It began in autumn 2021, when Algeria – the main supplier of gas to Spain – severed diplomatic relations with Morocco and closed the gas pipeline GME passing through its territory. In March 2022, yielding to the pressure of Rabat, Madrid changed its position on Western Sahara, de facto recognizing its belonging to Morocco. Since the start of the special military operation in Ukraine and before the acceptance of the Moroccan autonomy plan, everything indicated that Spain could play a key role in meeting the EU new energy security needs through its privileged relationship with Algeria. Having temporarily normalized its relations with Morocco, Spain missed the opportunity to become a European gas hub, ceding this role to Italy. Currently, the very structure of the Spanish energy sector is changing, and the country is going to close all operating nuclear power plants. Madrid is betting on diversifying energy supplies, the Algerian gas is being replaced by the American LNG. Russian gas supplies to Spain, previously not so significant, continue to decrease. The country is set to make a serious contribution to the energy transition since it has numerous renewable energy sources, technologies, production capacities and developed infrastructure. Events in Ukraine have accelerated the already existing energy crisis. As energy prices increased, Spain put forward the initiative for the European Union to approve emergency measures to deal with it. The solution, according to Madrid, is the acceleration of the energy transition. Brussels has actually allowed Spain to set top prices for gas that is used to generate electricity, thus lowering the bills for customers. Within the EU framework Madrid has achieved recognition of the special energy status of the Iberian Peninsula, and together with France and Portugal intends to build a new gas pipeline that will supply Europe with green hydrogen and, in the transition period, with natural gas. In general, Spain, although not without difficulties, is rather successfully coping with the current energy crisis.

The Catalan crisis raises deep concerns about the very nature of European democracy. This is no longer an internal affair of Spain – rather a European and global crisis. Brussels, having declared that the Catalan problem is an internal affair of Spain, cannot completely abstract from it, both for economic and political reasons. It is quite obvious that the Spanish political elite failed to come up with an attractive alternative for Catalonia, or even a basis for a positive dialogue. By decisively taking the side of Madrid after the unilateral declaration of independence, the European Union has caused great disappointment among the Catalan nationalists. The EU is "tired" of crises and seeks to avoid involvement where possible, and it also lacks political or legal tools to resolve separatist-related problems. The European Union turned out to be unprepared for the Catalan crisis politically and intellectually. An extensive network of the EU authorities in the field of crisis management has shown its ineffectiveness. The example of Catalonia clearly demonstrates that the issue of separatism in general poses a serious threat to the European Union and the future of European integration. This threat is twofold. The rise of separatism in Catalonia led to a deep constitutional and political crisis in Spain itself, superimposed on economic problems, especially aggravated during the pandemic. The fourth EU economy is faced with an acute problem of maintaining territorial integrity. The Catalan crisis demonstrated the inability of Brussels to resolve this kind of conflict with mechanisms at its disposal. New mechanisms are needed that can ensure an optimal balance between supranational, state and local government institutions. The events in Catalonia have clearly demonstrated that separatist movements can pose no less a threat to integration as such recognized challenges as terrorism, migration, climate change and cybersecurity. Crises emerging within the European Union have become a serious obstacle to further integration; consequently, the focus of the EU's anti-crisis policy is gradually shifting from external problems to internal ones.

The article analyzes the changes that have characterized Spain's approach to NATO in the post-Cold War era, and more specifically, the approach of different political parties to security and defense issues. If the People's Party is more Atlantic ideologically and traditionally, and therefore, is more in favor of strengthening cooperation with NATO, the socialists are increasingly pro-European and, therefore, advocate the strengthening of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Spain doesn't question the necessity of NATO, the presence of American military forces in Europe in general and in Spain in particular as a method of security enhancing. Fears of marginalization caused the accession of Spain to this military organization after its eastward extension. In recent years, Spain's influence and authority in NATO declined amid the economic crisis. This loss of authority will be overcome as soon as the economic growth is resumed. Notwithstanding that its ambitions in NATO and EU do not meet its possibilities, Spain is participating in different missions and naval exercises of the Alliance, and is constantly modernizing its military forces. Spain has always been indifferent to the hypothetical threat from the East, but is more than apprehensive to the threat coming from the situation in Libya, instability in Tunisia and especially an eventual destabilization in Morocco where Spanish cities Ceuta and Melilla are situated. Under the pretext of struggle against international terrorism, Madrid is trying to reestablish its influence in North Africa. Spain favors the transformation of NATO into an effective tool to prevent regional conflicts. The country's national interests will continue to determine its attention to problems of the Mediterranean and North Africa. The economic crisis has contributed to a drop in the objective value of bilateral relations with the United States and of Trans-Atlantic relations as a whole.

The article analyzes the changes that characterize Spanish approach to political aspects of European integration, and more specifically, the approach of different political parties to the process. Spanish political circles and even think tanks pay relatively little attention to theoretical aspects of European integration, whereas practical relations with the EU are of paramount importance. This is due to the fact that the question of belonging to the EU was settled in Spain long ago and definitively. Majoritarian character of Spanish democracy facilitates the transfer of powers from Brussels to Madrid, i.e. objectively favors the choice of federalization. Nevertheless, Spain continues to upload its national preferences onto the EU decision-making process. In recent years, Spain's influence and authority in the EU have declined because of the economic crisis. This loss of authority will be overcome as soon as the economic growth is resumed. Constantly emphasizing its belonging to the core of the EU, the "Old Europe", and to the core of the euro zone, maintaining close relationship with the Latin group within the EU, Spain has consistently advocated a united and strong Europe with a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The article considers the causes and the nature of the economic crisis which was a heavy blow for Spanish economy being in need of structural reforms. The domestic political consequences of the crisis included the change of government, the emergence of new protest movements and strengthening of separatism. Under the Brussels' pressure, Spain was forced to make significant adjustments to its national anti-crisis strategy which had a high social price. Particular attention is given to relations with the EU and the impact of the crisis on the country's foreign policy.

The article provides an overview of the history of this "forgotten" conflict, as well as its current state. The author reveals the position of stakeholders, including the European Union, France, the U.S. and Russia. Particular attention is paid to the position of Spain as a former colonial power, and to the correlation of the conflict with other problems in the Spanish-Moroccan relations.