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AbstractThis paper examines several aspects of Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science. The paper questions the nature of the task, as ontologies are debated in a scientific field once there is a widely accepted substantive theory that stands in need of interpretation, as with Newtonian physics or quantum mechanics; doing this job for international relations (IR) is highly questionable give that there is no widely accepted substantive theory of IR that needs an interpretation. Second, the paper questions Wendt's view of the consequences for ontology of quantum theory being replaced in the future; Wendt the interpretation of the history of science maintains that in the physical sciences a new theory subsumes the older theory, including its ontology. But, this seems to misread history, while the empirical content of classical physics is subsumed by relativity theory, it is far from true that the former's ontology was subsumed. The ontologies are in sharp contrast. The paper raises questions also about the notion of 'truth' and of the meaningfulness of evaluative concepts like 'justice'.

This paper seeks to show ways in which analytic eclecticism can be strengthened to encourage hybrid theorizing capable of yielding more practically useful principles for foreign policy decision-makers. The paper also seeks to show that some of the advantages of analytic eclecticism are overstated, notably the ability to sidestep difficult questions in the philosophy of social science. Nevertheless, with a proper deepening of their discussion of pragmatism, the core of the practical consequences of analytic eclecticism can be advanced with greater force and with a strengthened methodological rationale.

The article looks at one of the central arguments of Patrick Jackson's book The Conduct of Enquiry in International Relations: the attempt to advance methodological pluralism and dialogue among contending metatheoretical schools of International Relations. The article supports the goal of pluralism but argues that there is a significant gap in Jackson's support of it and that his version of pluralism inhibits metatheoretical engagement of different schools of thought. The latter in turn limits the possibility of progress in the field. The article outlines the missing steps in Jackson's argument, the way in which he unduly limits the contribution that the philosophy of science can make to scientific progress and an alternative argument for pluralism that leaves a role for genuine philosophical engagement and the possibility of progress in IR. Adapted from the source document.

The article looks at one of the central arguments of Patrick Jackson's book The Conduct of Enquiry in International Relations: the attempt to advance methodological pluralism and dialogue among contending metatheoretical schools of International Relations. The article supports the goal of pluralism but argues that there is a significant gap in Jackson's support of it and that his version of pluralism inhibits metatheoretical engagement of different schools of thought. The latter in turn limits the possibility of progress in the field. The article outlines the missing steps in Jackson's argument, the way in which he unduly limits the contribution that the philosophy of science can make to scientific progress and an alternative argument for pluralism that leaves a role for genuine philosophical engagement and the possibility of progress in IR.

AbstractThis article argues that scientific and critical realism have embraced several mistaken claims, among them that social science enquiry cannot proceed unless the theoretical objects of study are specified in advance. The article argues, rather, that although pre-scientific, observable objects and events must be specified from the outset, theoretical objects come to our attention only in the course of formulating theories. The article advances an alternative to scientific realist and critical realist foundations, namely, causal conventionalism, which is an adaptation to the social sciences of several elements of Pierre Duhem's conventionalist account of physical science. The article argues that major goals of theorising that scientific realism and critical realism seek to fulfill are better satisfied by the conventionalist alternative. In an effort to clarify some important issues, the article identifies and responds to a series of related criticisms of my views offered by Colin Wight in his recent article 'A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Won't Work!' in 'Millennium', and in his book, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology.1