Suchergebnisse

Why does someone join an extremist group? What are the pathways via which individuals join such groups? How does one show commitment to an extremist group? Why does someone participate in acts of terrorism? Drawing on 175 interviews with current and former members of Islamist extremist groups in Indonesia and the Philippines, Becoming Jihadis: Radicalization and Commitment in Southeast Asia answers these questions by exploring the socio-emotionalunderpinnings of joining an extremist group. This book argues that social ties play a critical role at every juncture in the joining process, from initial engagement to commitment to participation in jihad experiences, paramilitary training, and terrorism. It unpacks the process by which members build a sense ofcommunity, connection, solidarity, and brotherhood; how they come to trust and love one another; and how ideology functions as a binding agent, not a cause. Becoming Jihadis draws its conclusions from broad patterns data based on nearly a decade of iterated interviews with current and former members of Islamist extremist groups between 2010 and 2019, as well as partial life histories detailing the journeys of men and women who joined Indonesian and Filipino extremist groups. This book makes a unique contribution to the literature on terrorism and radicalization for students, practitioners, and policymakers.

Why do hard-line terrorists decide to leave their organizations and quit the world of terror and destruction? This is the question for which Julie Chernov Hwang seeks answers in Why Terrorists Quit.Over the course of six years Chernov Hwang conducted more than one hundred interviews with current and former leaders and followers of radical Islamist groups in Indonesia. Using what she learned from these radicals she examines the reasons they rejected physical force and extremist ideology, slowly moving away from, or in some cases completely leaving, groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujahidin KOMPAK, Ring Banten, Laskar Jihad, and Tanah Runtuh. Why Terrorists Quit considers the impact of various public initiatives designed to encourage radicals to disengage, and follows the lives of five radicals from the various groups, seeking to establish trends, ideas, and reasons for why radicals might eschew violence or quit terrorism.Chernov Hwang has, with this book, provided a clear picture of why Indonesians disengage from jihadist groups, what the state can do to help them reintegrate into nonterrorist society, and how what happens in Indonesia can be more widely applied beyond the archipelago.

In Peaceful Islamist Mobilization in the Muslim World: What Went Right , Julie Chernov Hwang presents a compelling and innovative new theory and framework for examining the variation in Islamist mobilization strategies in Muslim Asia and the Middle East.

What prompted Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to turn away from terror tactics? This article argues JI did not disengage from violence per se because it did not demobilize and disarm. Instead, it is more appropriate to view JI as having postponed amaliyat (actions) until such time as it has built up sufficient support among the population. This occurred in response to three factors: the realization of the costs exacted on the network by the 2002 Bali bombing; the splintering off of the group's pro-bombing wing; and the series of mass arrests following the disruption of its project to build a secure base in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Taken together, these events reinforced the understanding that dakwah (Islamic propagation) had to precede jihad, a view that was already present within parts of the JI network prior to certain members' decision to undertake terrorist attacks. This article explores how JI members who were involved in terror attacks revised their previously held views in light of these experiences. (Contemp South-east Asia/GIGA)

"Since 2000, more than twenty countries around the world have held elections in which parties that espouse a political agenda based on an Islamic worldview have competed for legislative seats. Islamist Parties and Political Normalization in the Muslim World examines the impact these parties have had on the political process in two different areas of the world with large Muslim populations: the Middle East and Asia. The book's contributors examine major cases of Islamist party evolution and participation in democratic and semidemocratic systems in Turkey, Morocco, Yemen, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. Collectively they articulate a theoretical framework to understand the strategic behavior of Islamist parties, including the characteristics that distinguish them from other types of political parties, how they relate to other parties as potential competitors or collaborators, how ties to broader Islamist movements may affect party behavior in elections, and how participation in an electoral system can affect the behavior and ideology of an Islamist party over time. Through this framework, the contributors observe a general tendency in Islamist politics. Although Islamist parties represent diverse interests and behaviors that are tied to their particular domestic contexts, through repeated elections they often come to operate less as antiestablishment parties and more in line with the political norms of the regimes in which they compete. While a few parties have deliberately chosen to remain on the fringes of their political system, most have found significant political rewards in changing their messages and behavior to attract more centrist voters. As the impact of the Arab Spring continues to be felt, Islamist Parties and Political Normalization in the Muslim World offers a nuanced and timely perspective of Islamist politics in broader global context."--Publisher's website

This article compares how individuals from two different Salafi‐jihadi groups disengage from high‐risk activism and political violence. Drawing on original interviews, we explore the "push" and "pull" factors that influence our respondents' decisions to leave. We identify numerous push‐and‐pull factors that are consistent with previous research, including disagreements with group leaders over strategy and practices and educational and employment opportunities. We also contribute to existing research by including "persistent activists" in our sample who did not disengage. Surprisingly, these respondents remained in their groups despite experiencing some of the same push‐and‐pull factors as those who left. Including this variation allows us to separate necessary but insufficient conditions of disengagement from factors that exert a more profound impact. We highlight the influence of one key factor—and its absence—in our discussion: alternative social networks with supportive outsiders for those who left and the lack of such meaningful relationships for those who remained. We conclude by discussing the implications of our research for countering violent extremism.