Suchergebnisse

Os mais dramáticos e mais divulgados episódios da crise mundial tem sido financeiros: o colapso do mercado de crédito de hipotecas em 2007, a falha dos irmãos Lehmann em setembro de 2008 e mais recentemente o comércio bancário da Euro zona e a soberana crise de débito. Esses é claro ocorreram cada um em seu tempo e tiveram seu próprio impacto na produção, comércio e emprego. Mas isso não faz da crise uma "crise da financeirização" ou do "neoliberalismo", mas do capitalismo tout court em certo momento de sua história. Suas causas subjacentes são superprodução e superacumulação a nível mundial e um jogo eficaz da tendência da taxa de lucro para cair apesar do recurso por capital dos fatores de compensação. A duração da crise, que é agora chamada não de 'Grande Recessão' Americana mas sim de crise global (McNally,2011), e o fim da fase onde a China e o Brasil pareciam estar dissociadas da crise mundial são expressões disto.Palavras-chave: Crise mundial, burguesia, Capital.THE HISTORICAL SETTING AND ORIGINAL TRAITS OF THE WORLD CRISISAbstract: The most dramatic and most publicized episodes of the world crisis have been financial: the subprime mortgage market collapse in 2007, the failure of Lehmann Brothers in September 2008 and more recently the Eurozone banking and sovereign debt crisis. They have of course each time had their own impact on production, trade and employment. But this does not make the crisis a "crisis of financialisation" or of "neoliberalism", but of capitalism tout court at a given momentof its history. Its underlying causes are overproduction and over-accumulation at world level and an effective play of thetendency of the rate of profit to fall despite the recourse by capital to the offsetting factors. The length of the crisis, which is now named not a US 'Great Recession" but a global slump (McNally, 2011), and the end of the phase where China and Brazil appeared to be decoupled from the world crisis are expressions of this.Key words: World crisis, bourgeoisie, Capital.

AbstractThis paper argues that present-day imperialism is strongly related to the domination of a precise form of capital, namely highly concentrated interest- and dividend-bearing money-capital which operates in financial markets, breeds today's pervasive fetishism of money, but is totally dependent on surplus-value and production. Two mechanisms ensure the appropriation and/or production of surplus-product and its centralisation to the world system's financial hubs. In the 1980s, foreign debt prevailed. Foreign production and profit repatriation by TNCs now represent the main channel. Following the transfer abroad of part of its production by US TNCs, the issue for the US in their relations with the rest of the world is not the commercialisation of surplus through exports, but dependency on imports and, more crucially, on large inflows of money-capital to support the stock market, buy T-bonds and refinance mortgage. This new dependency helps to explain the 'paradox' that US imperialism is increasingly forced to try and offset this through extra-economic and even military coercion where it can.