The Laws of War and Public Opinion: An Experimental Study
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 171, Heft 1, S. 181
ISSN: 1614-0559
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 171, Heft 1, S. 181
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 111, Heft 3, S. 801-805
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 533
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Working paper
In: Review of international political economy, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 614-642
ISSN: 1466-4526
In: Review of International Political Economy, Forthcoming
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In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Band 171, Heft 1, S. 181-201
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In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 108, S. 373-376
ISSN: 2169-1118
In: American Society of International Law Proceedings, Band 108, S. 373-376
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In: Chicago Journal of International Law (15): 110-137
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In: University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue, Band 80, S. 105-115
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"This book explores whether constitutionalizing rights improves respect for those rights in practice. Drawing on global statistical analyses, survey experiments in Turkey and the U.S, and case studies in Colombia, Myanmar, Poland, Russia, and Tunisia, the book advances three claims. First, enshrining rights in constitutions does not automatically ensure that those rights will be respected. For rights to matter, rights violations need to be politically costly, which is the case when citizens punish the government for rights violations. Doing so, however, is often difficult to accomplish for unconnected groups of citizens. Second, some rights are easier to enforce than others. Specifically, some rights come with natural constituencies that can mobilize for their enforcement. This is the case for rights that are practiced by and within organizations, or "organizational rights," such as the rights to religious freedom, unionize, and form political parties. Because religious groups, trade unions and parties are highly organized, they are well-equipped to use the constitution to resist rights violations. As a result, these rights are systematically associated with better practices. By contrast, rights that are practiced on an individual basis, such as free speech or the prohibition of torture, often lack natural constituencies to enforce them, which makes it easier for governments to violate these rights. Third, even highly organized groups armed with the constitution may not be able to stop governments dedicated to rights-repression. When constitutional rights are enforced by dedicated organizations, they are thus best understood as speed bumps that slow down attempts at repression"--
In: Oxford scholarship online
'How Constitutional Rights Matter' explores whether constitutionalizing rights improves respect for those rights in practice. Drawing on global statistical analyses, case studies in Colombia, Myanmar, Poland, Russia, and Tunisia, and survey experiments in Turkey and the United States, this text examines this important topic.
Antitrust law is one of the most commonly deployed instruments of economic regulation around the world. To date, over 130 countries have adopted a domestic antitrust law. These countries comprise developed and developing nations alike, and combined produce over 95 percent of the world's GDP. Most of the countries that have adopted an antitrust law have done so since 1990. This period of significant proliferation of antitrust laws also coincides with a notable expansion of international trade agreements, including the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the negotiation of numerous bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. These concurrent trends are consistent with the view that antitrust regulation and trade liberalization are complementary tools in governments' efforts to create and preserve open and competitive markets.
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In: Law and Contemporary Problems, Forthcoming
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Working paper
In: Journal of Law and Economics (Forthcoming)
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Working paper