Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe implementation experiences of the CBRLDP demonstrate that the design, reform and implementation of pro‐poor institutional arrangements are not merely a technical or managerial matter but a profoundly political exercise. This is underscored by the sheer determination of stakeholders engaged with the CBRLDP to shift the burden of the reforms elsewhere by taking recourse mainly to informal institutions within the framework of the evolving institutional arrangements governing land ownership and use. In addition, the question of citizenship based on the notion of autochthony is invoked by communities with excess land to the extent that new settlers have to contend with the constant threat that their land is open to contestation by the natives. The main argument of this paper therefore is that these experiences have greatly undermined the prospects of the CBRLDP to generate valuable lessons as a potential blueprint for sustainable land reform across the country and for further fine‐tuning the draft land legislative framework. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This article appraises the prospects of the District Assembly system inaugu- rated under the auspices of decentralisation policy reforms introduced to insti- tutionalise local governance structures and processes that are responsive, demo- cratic, and capable of improving the livelihoods of the poor. While there seems to be reasonable consensus about the desirability of a decentralised planning framework as a vehicle for sustainable governance, development and poverty reduction, most stakeholders are nevertheless primarily motivated by the desire to advance, safeguard and gratify self-interests. Therefore, the major thrust of the argument of this paper is that unless these self-seeking tendencies are effec- tively tamed, the trinity of good governance, development and poverty reduc- tion in the evolving structures and processes of local government will remain an unattainable ideal.

This article seeks to demonstrate how traditional leaders have strategically exploited the decentralization policy reforms to reassert themselves as a dominant force in grassroots politics in Malawi. This assessment is situated within the context of the debate about the relevance of traditional leadership institutions or alternatively culture in the twin processes of democratization and decentralization. While one side of the debate dismisses them as sheer obstacles, the other side argues that they are a resource that can be tapped into in order to effectively domesticate the reforms, since traditional leaders embody values and virtues of political accountability, transparency and probity. The underlying argument of this article is that while research findings demonstrate that traditional leaders have indeed the potential to play a midwife role in the efforts to domesticate and customize the reforms to the exigencies of local conditions, their ill material circumstances render them overwhelmingly easy targets for politicians bent on satisfying their own strategic political considerations. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract Using the principle of community targeting, the 2003 Winter Targeted Input Programme was designed to extend free inputs to about 400,000 households in rural Malawi on the basis of access to dambo, and poverty status. The tendency for most communities was, however, to modify the stipulated criteria on the basis of their perceptions and interpretations of need, entitlement and equity. Strikingly, even though the resulting criteria often reflected priorities conflicting with the officially prescribed guidelines, they were nevertheless not necessarily motivated by fraudulent intentions, though there were some isolated cases of ill‐intention. This article therefore advocates at least the incorporation of views from below in the design of interventions of this nature in order to ensure that they achieve the overall desired strategic impact.