Search results

AbstractThe paper examines the structure and performance of the textiles and clothing sectors in Zimbabwe. Based on firm level data, it examines the challenges and factors behind the resilience of the two sectors. It shows that increased flexibility, reduced capacity utilisation, modernisation of production systems and production incentives were among the most important factors exploited by firms to remain in business. It shows the main hindrance as macroeconomic instability that caused raw materials and skills shortages. It concludes that the sectors still have comparative advantage that can be exploited in a stable economy. The challenge is that the longer the current crisis goes unresolved, the more likely it is that the sectors will lose all the potential comparative advantage, implying that firms that have survived the crisis since 1997 may eventually be forced to shut down. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper analyses the structure of Namibia's fishery sector, which consists of both marine-based fisheries and aquaculture. The study examines the sectors' governance structure and the evolution of fishery stocks and assesses the performance of the sector in terms of catch effort, sectoral contribution to GDP, employment, and contribution to international trade. The analysis concentrates on the marine-based fisheries and applies two analytical methods: a qualitative approach that solicits views from local fishing associations and companies and a quantitative approach that uses the decision support model to identify realistic export opportunities. The main challenges inhibiting the growth of Namibia's fishery sector include a shortage of skilled labor, a lack of vessels, seismic impacts of oil exploration, and threats posed by proposed phosphate mining at sea. The paper also examines the government's drive for value addition, arguing that what is deemed value addition from one angle may constitute value destruction from another. The authors also argue that the drive for value addition may cause companies to face problems with their current trading partners, who may use sanitary and phytosanitary measures to restrict the entry of processed fish into their markets. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; AGRODEP ; MTID

AbstractThe dramatic reduction in poverty in Uganda and Ghana in the 1990s was derived largely from the liberalisation of the export price received by a labour‐intensive peasant export sector. Other African economies ought to be able to derive inspiration from this manifestation of the invisible hand, but can they? Several other African peasant export economies experienced price liberalisation during the structural adjustment period, but without experiencing anything like the same positive poverty reduction dynamic. Two reasons are fairly clear—liberalising countries varied in the extent to which they passed on higher export prices, and they also varied in the extent to which they impacted on dimensions of governance, especially the politics of market access, in the rest of the economy. The latter continues to be an important research frontier for future investigators. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

AbstractThis study develops a model of opportunistic behaviour in which an incumbent government resorts to expansionary fiscal and/or monetary stimuli to foster economic growth and thus, maximize the probability of re‐election. Using a panel dataset of 31 African countries covering the period 1980 to 2009, we test whether donor aid facilitates such political business cycles and investigate their effect on growth. We find evidence that donors, through guaranteeing support to incumbent governments, may unwittingly instigate political business cycles. With forbearance, and sometimes complicity by donors, aid seems to allow incumbent governments to instigate macroeconomic stimuli that ensure electoral victory with no fear of losing aid support. © 2015 UNU‐WIDER. Journal of International Development published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This study develops a model of opportunistic behaviour in which an incumbent government resorts to expansionary fiscal and/or monetary stimuli to foster economic growth and thus, maximize the probability of re-election. Using a panel dataset of 31 African countries covering the period 1980 to 2009, we test whether donor aid facilitates such political business cycles and investigate their effect on growth. We find evidence that donors, through guaranteeing support to incumbent governments, may unwittingly instigate political business cycles. With forbearance, and sometimes complicity by donors, aid seems to allow incumbent governments to instigate macroeconomic stimuli that ensure electoral victory with no fear of losing aid support.