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In "Marketing Barriers Facing Developing Country Manufactures Exporters: A Conceptual Note" (The Journal of Development Studies, 1991, 27, 4, 137-150), S. Lall noted that conventional export theories tend to neglect the role of marketing barriers to new entrants. Here, two themes are further developed: (1) firms from developing countries may not have the incentive to maintain quality standards; & (2) consumers in developed countries may have a country of origin bias toward new products from developing countries. 10 References. Adapted from the source document.

Korean economic development; nature of Korean people; management style, business etiquette; working with Koreans; partnership; enjoying leisure; Korean fact file

Abstract

Ethics of business leadership has witnessed a renewed interest in recent years provoked perhaps by a number of cases of business leadership failure. Unlike the critics of the industrial policy and direct market intervention by the state, in this paper we argue for an increased role of the state in imposing the ethical standards and the need to integrate the ethical infrastructure into the state's industrial policy. We believe that overall national economic success is dependent on four essential elements: financial infrastructure, physical infrastructure, knowledge infrastructure and ethical infrastructure. We further believe that proper integration and correct functioning of these elements within the state's industrial policy is fundamental to economic development and growth in any country in 21st century. We consider that the ethical infrastructure might provide an important element of a possible riposte in the future to the serious financial scandals of the kind that recently affected global business. We foresee that ethical infrastructure fosters best practice. In this paper, we argue that the integration of the ethical infrastructure is a new requirement of the state's industrial policy.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper takes individuals as rational economic decision makers but ones operating within well-defined groups not just today but into the future when a reputation for fair dealing will be of significance. The paper explores the functional advantages which might accrue from group membership in such circumstances. As social science makes clear, most groups come into being for social and cultural reasons independent of any obvious immediate economic advantage. For this reason, this paper is exploratory of the boundary between economic reasoning and that of other social sciences. It explores the "bridge too far," cited by Loveridge in the 1993 special edition of this journal. This is a metaphor for the possibility of a meaningful connector between social psychological and economic reasoning. This paper tentatively looks into the relationships that might be established between the specific economic analysis covered by this paper and that deployed in other social sciences. In essence, the paper suggests that both reputational and informational benefits arise from group behavior. These benefits accrue to both its members and others. By extension it is argued that similar advantages can accrue to "families" of products in marketing. In both cases, reputational "linkage" serves as a commitment device (Schelling, 1960) with ensuing benefits to all members of the group or product family. These relationships are seen to mediate the reputational guarantees given to consumers.

In this paper we try to explain how price discrimination can cause bilateral trade patterns of the type seen under countertrade agreements. We interpret countertrade as a form of transaction bundling, which can discriminate between potential trading partners, and we combine characteristics from two explanations as to the existence of countertrade: Price discrimination through transaction bundling, and adverse selection arising from the uncertainty in the quality of the goods produced by trading partners in a less developed country (LDC) leading to a partner preference from the side of the Western (DC) firm. Our paper shows that the trade volume prospects of a firm in a LDC can be considerably enhanced if a countertrade transaction is bundled, and that such gains in trade become greater (relative to the case of no bundling), the greater the degree of quality uncertainty in the good it sells. It is also shown that it is profit maximising for a firm in a DC to offer mixed bundling for the exchange transaction, and that the profits derived from such bundling are a decreasing function of both the degree of uncertainty in the good sold by the firm in the LDC, and the marginal cost of the good sold by firm in the DC.

This paper refers to herding behaviour as developed in Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Bannerjee (1992) and Choi and Scarpa (1994). We examine the behaviour of a potential customer who does not know how many of her predecessorsdecided not to purchase the product. We show that, ceteris paribus,a smaller (larger) customer base increases the likelihood of a positive(negative) cascade. Hence, a firm can signal its commitment to high quality(Schelling 1960) by choosing to develop a customer base that relies upon thecustomer's 'private' information rather than one that relies on an informational cascade.