Suchergebnisse

Previous research (Zick et al. 2008) suggested that animosity toward social minorities in Europe is intertwined, forming a syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity (GFE). In the current research, we extended the notion of GFE by identifying the GFE structure in a non-European context (South Korea). We also tested a novel hypothesis that stipulates an interplay between individuals' self-concept and their value orientation in predicting the overall level of GFE. Two nation-wide surveys in South Korea showed that antagonism toward social minorities that have typically been marginalized and devalued in that country forms GFE while reflecting the unique intergroup context of Korean society. Further, we found as expected that independence in self-concept and a collectivistic value orientation jointly predict lower levels of GFE (Study 1). When political orientation and national identification were taken into account, the predicted interaction was observed only on antagonism toward ingroup minorities but not toward outgroup minorities by race or ethnicity (Study 2). Implications of these findings and directions for research on GFE are discussed.

Drawing on uncertainty‐identity theory (Hogg, 2012), we explore the effects of uncertainty concerning a specific social identity on group identification and attitudes toward subgroup integration and separation in South Koreans' nested identity context (N = 148). All variables were measured. Path analysis revealed, as predicted, that superordinate identity uncertainty weakened superordinate identification and subgroup identity uncertainty weakened subgroup identification. We also found that subgroup identity uncertainty strengthened superordinate identification. This effect was stronger for those who perceived their superordinate group prototype and subgroup prototype to be distinct and nonoverlapping. Furthermore, superordinate identity uncertainty decreased reunification intentions by weakening superordinate identification. Subgroup identity uncertainty increased reunification intentions by strengthening superordinate identification only for those who perceived their superordinate group prototype and subgroup prototype to be distinct and nonoverlapping. Implications for uncertainty identity theory and intergroup relations are discussed.

The present study examined the joint impact of collectivistic value orientation and independent self-representation of group members upon group creativity. In a laboratory experiment involving three-person student teams ( N = 72), we induced a collectivistic (vs. an individualistic) value orientation and independent (vs. interdependent) self-representation via priming methods. Using a group-brainstorming paradigm, we found as expected that groups generated more original ideas when members combined a collectivistic value orientation with independent self-representation than with interdependent self-representation. By contrast, differences in self-representation did not have a significant effect when an individualistic value orientation was made salient. Furthermore, we found that this effect was mediated by the degree of idea fixation within the group, thereby illuminating the underlying cognitive mechanism of the observed synergy effect. Implications of the findings for research on group creativity and future directions are discussed.

During the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. conservative politicians and the media downplayed the risk of both contracting COVID-19 and the effectiveness of recommended health behaviors. Health behavior theories suggest perceived vulnerability to a health threat and perceived effectiveness of recommended health-protective behaviors determine motivation to follow recommendations. Accordingly, we predicted that—as a result of politicization of the pandemic—politically conservative Americans would be less likely to enact recommended health-protective behaviors. In two longitudinal studies of U.S. residents, political conservatism was inversely associated with perceived health risk and adoption of health-protective behaviors over time. The effects of political orientation on health-protective behaviors were mediated by perceived risk of infection, perceived severity of infection, and perceived effectiveness of the health-protective behaviors. In a global cross-national analysis, effects were stronger in the U.S. (N = 10,923) than in an international sample (total N = 51,986), highlighting the increased and overt politicization of health behaviors in the U.S.

During the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. conservative politicians and the media downplayed the risk of both contracting COVID-19 and the effectiveness of recommended health behaviors. Health behavior theories suggest perceived vulnerability to a health threat and perceived effectiveness of recommended health-protective behaviors determine motivation to follow recommendations. Accordingly, we predicted that—as a result of politicization of the pandemic—politically conservative Americans would be less likely to enact recommended health-protective behaviors. In two longitudinal studies of U.S. residents, political conservatism was inversely associated with perceived health risk and adoption of health-protective behaviors over time. The effects of political orientation on health-protective behaviors were mediated by perceived risk of infection, perceived severity of infection, and perceived effectiveness of the health-protective behaviors. In a global cross-national analysis, effects were stronger in the U.S. (N = 10,923) than in an international sample (total N = 51,986), highlighting the increased and overt politicization of health behaviors in the U.S.

The present paper examines longitudinally how subjective perceptions about COVID-19, one's community, and the government predict adherence to public health measures to reduce the spread of the virus. Using an international survey (N = 3040), we test how infection risk perception, trust in the governmental response and communications about COVID-19, conspiracy beliefs, social norms on distancing, tightness of culture, and community punishment predict various containment-related attitudes and behavior. Autoregressive analyses indicate that, at the personal level, personal hygiene behavior was predicted by personal infection risk perception. At social level, social distancing behaviors such as abstaining from face-to-face contact were predicted by perceived social norms. Support for behavioral mandates was predicted by confidence in the government and cultural tightness, whereas support for anti-lockdown protests was predicted by (lower) perceived clarity of communication about the virus. Results are discussed in light of policy implications and creating effective interventions.

During the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. conservative politicians and the media downplayed the risk of both contracting COVID-19 and the effectiveness of recommended health behaviors. Health behavior theories suggest perceived vulnerability to a health threat and perceived effectiveness of recommended health-protective behaviors determine motivation to follow recommendations. Accordingly, we predicted that-as a result of politicization of the pandemic-politically conservative Americans would be less likely to enact recommended health-protective behaviors. In two longitudinal studies of U.S. residents, political conservatism was inversely associated with perceived health risk and adoption of health-protective behaviors over time. The effects of political orientation on health-protective behaviors were mediated by perceived risk of infection, perceived severity of infection, and perceived effectiveness of the health-protective behaviors. In a global cross-national analysis, effects were stronger in the U.S. (N = 10,923) than in an international sample (total N = 51,986), highlighting the increased and overt politicization of health behaviors in the U.S.

Background. The effective implementation of government policies and measures for controlling the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic requires compliance from the public. This study aimed to examine cross-sectional and longitudinal associations of trust ingovernment regarding COVID-19 control with the adoption of recommended health behaviours and prosocial behaviours, and potential determinants of trust in government duringthe pandemic.Methods. This study analysed data from the PsyCorona Survey, an international project onCOVID-19 that included 23 733 participants from 23 countries (representative in age andgender distributions by country) at baseline survey and 7785 participants who also completedfollow-up surveys. Specification curve analysis was used to examine concurrent associationsbetween trust in government and self-reported behaviours. We further used structural equation model to explore potential determinants of trust in government. Multilevel linear regressions were used to examine associations between baseline trust and longitudinal behavioural changes.Results. Higher trust in government regarding COVID-19 control was significantly associatedwith higher adoption of health behaviours (handwashing, avoiding crowded space, self-quarantine) and prosocial behaviours in specification curve analyses (median standardised β =0.173 and 0.229, p < 0.001). Government perceived as well organised, disseminating clear messages and knowledge on COVID-19, and perceived fairness were positively associated withtrust in government (standardised β = 0.358, 0.230, 0.056, and 0.249, p < 0.01). Higher trustat baseline survey was significantly associated with lower rate of decline in health behavioursover time ( p for interaction = 0.001).Conclusions. These results highlighted the importance of trust in government in the control of Covid-19.

The present paper examines longitudinally how subjective perceptions about COVID-19, one's community, and the government predict adherence to public health measures to reduce the spread of the virus. Using an international survey (N = 3040), we test how infection risk perception, trust in the governmental response and communications about COVID-19, conspiracy beliefs, social norms on distancing, tightness of culture, and community punishment predict various containment-related attitudes and behavior. Autoregressive analyses indicate that, at the personal level, personal hygiene behavior was predicted by personal infection risk perception. At social level, social distancing behaviors such as abstaining from face-to-face contact were predicted by perceived social norms. Support for behavioral mandates was predicted by confidence in the government and cultural tightness, whereas support for anti-lockdown protests was predicted by (lower) perceived clarity of communication about the virus. Results are discussed in light of policy implications and creating effective interventions.