Suchergebnisse

1. Democracy and prosperity / Randall G. Holcombe -- 2. Competition among governments : the state's two roles in a globalized world / Viktor J. Vanberg -- 3. Rent extraction, liberalism, and economic development / Roger D. Congleton -- 4. Institutions for economic prosperity : an entrepreneurial perspective / Young Back Choi -- 5. Science, scientific institutions, and economic progress / Yong J. Yoon -- 6. University and industry linkages : the case of Korea / Joon-Mo Yang -- 7. Institutions and industrial policy : the case of heavy-chemical industries in Korea (1973-9) / Sung Sup Rhee -- 8. The myth about Korea's rapid growth / Jungho Yoo -- 9. The new institutional economy and the new traditional economy in Korea : does the Confucian tradition give it a competitive edge? / J. Barkley Rosser and Marina V. Rosser -- 10. The effect of fiscal drag on tax revenue and tax burden / Sung-Kyu Lee -- 11. Alternative visions of incomplete property rights / Md. Dulal Miah and Yasushi Suzuki -- 12. Economic development and institutions / Sung-Hee Jwa and Yong Yoon.

Abstract:In his critique of the newer approach in economic development emphasizing institutional reforms, Ha-Joon Chang, in his article titled 'Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History', equates New Institutional Economics with the program of liberal reforms for least developed countries (LDCs) and blames the former for the alleged failure of the latter. He argues with some justice that the dominant discourse in New Institutional Economics insufficiently appreciates the complexity of institutions; as a consequence, the difficulty of transplanting institutions is largely discounted. His case, however, is marred by his attempt to push down his ideological biases by marshalling inchoate, highly questionable and often contradictory ideas as facts. Going beyond a critical examination of the New Institutional Economics inspired discourse in development economics, he advocates his own version of beneficial development policies for LDCs – namely, economic democracy and industrial policies. His proposals are not only highly questionable, but they amount to adopting a double standard of exempting himself from the very criticisms he levies against New Institutional Economics – ignoring the difficulty of importing foreign institutions. Presuming to play God, like many development economists, he ignores the essential fact that an unwilling horse cannot be made to drink.

Abstract:Posner's economics of organization yields an unconventional view that private organizations operating in the market, the publicly held US business corporation, despite the profit motive, ends up being inefficient, paying excessive compensation to CEOs, while some public organizations, the US federal judicial system (and the judicial system of Continental Europe and Japan), despite the insulation of judges from most of incentives and the near complete autonomy afforded to them, works reasonably well. Unfortunately, Posner does not state clearly the criteria by which he judges one 'excessive' and the others 'works reasonably well', nor does he explain well why professional norms of judges that play a crucial role in public organizations are not a factor in business organizations.

Inequality in income and wealth distribution in society is
said to be a great concern to many social critics. Rarely is
the issue of inequality in income or wealth distribution, as
such, a concern for the majority of Americans as individuals,
however.

Abstract Criticism of the book by Choi is expressed by Professor Pressman and responded to by the author. Three problems are noted. These deal with ambiguities in the concept of paradigms and conventions, the relationship between them, and how individual feelings of envy and the notion of social conventions fail to provide a good justification for fully supporting entrepreneurship.