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Contribution to a special journal issue entitled "Rational Choice Theory & Politics" (see related abstracts in SA 44:1). Although rational choice theory has enjoyed only modest predictive success, it provides a powerful explanatory mechanism for social processes involving strategic interaction among individuals, & it stimulates interesting empirical inquiries. Rather than present competing theories to compare against rational choice, Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro (1984) have merely alluded to alternative explanatory variables, eg, culture, institutions, & social norms, without showing either how these factors can be incorporated into a more powerful theory, or how they are inconsistent with rational choice theory. It is likely that any eventual theory of the origin & maintenance of social institutions, norms, & values will have to reserve a central place for rational action. Adapted from the source document.

Tolerance does not depend entirely on the generosity of those who are willing to restrain themselves from punishing & repressing those who deviate from society's norms. Rather it depends also on the ability of people to assuage fears & anxieties & to reconcile themselves to social change. Because people are able to adapt psychologically to change in norms & practices, increases in tolerance are not necessarily accompanied by increases in self-restraint, social strain, or tension. Several illustrations of social adjustment regarding, eg, political, racial, & religious issues, are presented, as is a more exact dynamic model of how this process works. 56 References. Adapted from the source document.

Mass protest movements resemble assurance games, in which individual decisions to contribute are contingent on the aggregate level of participation. While participation in ineffective movements carries high costs and returns few collective and selective benefits, participation in successful social movements can be more advantageous than abstention. Supporters of a movement therefore try to coordinate their decisions with those of other activists, participating when it appears that the movement has sufficient popular support to be politically effective, but not otherwise. Such decisions, however, typically have to be made with considerable uncertainty about both the intentions of other individuals and the prospects of the movement as it develops. Given this individual calculus, a number of deductions can be drawn about the resources, strategies, goals, and political conditions that will be required to coordinate and organize mass social protest.

Because the benefits of participation in social movements are selective & conditioned on aggregate level of participation, mass protest movements can be viewed as assurance games amenable to cost-benefit analysis. While participation in unsuccessful movements carries high costs & returns few benefits, participation in effective movements carries more benefits than nonparticipation. Supporters of a movement therefore try to coordinate their decisions with those of other activists, participating when it appears that the movement has sufficient popular support to be politically effective, but not otherwise. The strategies, resources, goals, & political conditions required to coordinate & organize mass social protest are discussed given this individual calculus. Adapted from the source document.

Large-scale cooperation can often be manufactured out of small- scale relationships. People frequently cooperate in large-scale ventures in order to protect their reputations in everyday relationships, since an esteemed reputation has considerable instrumental value in a community. Moreover, regular social interaction is conducive not only to the develop ment of obligations and commitments, but also to the formation of other- regarding interests. These arguments are illustrated with a series of examples from the civil rights movement in the United States and other instances of collective action.