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This research note attempts to test the relationship between levels of socio-economic development and variation in political democracy with data gathered in Japanese prefectures. The operational measures of socio-economic development are the levels of urban-industrialism and social overhead capital, which are derived from the results of factor analysis of fifteen socio-economic indicators. Three measures of political democracy are obtained by factor-analyzing political indicators: they are the degrees of political competition, political participation, and representation equality. The analysis of the data reveals weak relationships between the two measures of socio-economic development and the three measures of political democracy. This finding challenges the validity of some generalizations regarding economic-political linkages previously reported in many cross-national studies. In the context of within-nation comparisons, this study suggests the need for a re-evaluation of the relationship between socio-economic development and political democracy.

Electoral victories and defeats occur repeatedly. This is especially true in democratic political systems where key governmental roles are filled through periodic elections. The attitude of defeated candidates toward the regime norms directly affects the system stability, because disaffected by defeat, these candidates may withdraw their support for the regime and may also translate such disaffection into radical political action. Despite the potential threat the defeated electoral candidates can pose to democratic stability, their political attitudes have rarely been investigated systematically in political science literature. Do defeated candidates exhibit an attitude toward the democratic rules and norms governing electoral competition significantly different from that of winning candidates? Do defeated candidates become politically less active after the election than they were before? Under what conditions do they become disaffected with the democratic rules and norms? This paper attempts, first, to compare the political attitudes of both winning and losing candidates, and second, to explore the variables which might account for differences in such attitudes.The data used in this paper are derived from a larger study of political recruitment in Oregon. Structured interviews were conducted with both winning and losing candidates who ran for the Oregon House of Representatives in the 1966 election. The samples were interviewed at three different times: before and after the primary, and after the general election. This research strategy permits us to analyze the effect of the outcome of the election on the attitudes of the candidates. Data were collected on the candidates' degree of support for the democratic rules of competition, their expected changes in political activity as a result of participation in the election, their career ambitions, and the perceived reward-cost, i.e., the material and psychological gains or losses which accrue to the candidates as a direct result of their participation in the election.

The objective is to assess the validity of one general proposition that has been central to much of the thinking and theorizing among students of comparative public administration. It is that the political roles ofpublic bureaucracies vary systematically with the regime types. This proposition is examined in the context of two disparate political systems; Korea and Turkey. The data are derived from personal interviews conducted with 232 Turkish and 225 Korean civil servants of the highest ranks. The analysis focuses on three aspects of the bureaucracy: its policy-making role, its accountability to the public, and the character of its professional norms. The evidence lends no support for the proposition and thereby raises some questions about its validity.