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Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Economists and Market-Conforming Reform -- 2. The New Economics and Politics of Taxation -- 3. New Zealand: Plotting a Market-Oriented Revolution -- 4. Ireland: Populist Politics in a Generalist System -- 5. Norway: Economic Experts in the Social-Democratic State -- 6. Denmark: Equality before Efficiency, Politicians before Experts -- 7. The Power of Economists within the State -- Appendix: List of Interviews -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

AbstractPoliticians need expertise to make public policies, and civil servants are principal and proximate providers of knowledge. Yet, what constitutes relevant knowledge and skills for bureaucrats is regularly contested—both by politicians and bureaucrats—and subject to change. How can we explain the processes of contestation and change in the expertise of policy bureaucracies? The article presents a theoretical framework for analyzing the politics of bureaucratic expertise. It proposes the concept of "expertise bargains" to capture the understanding between politicians and bureaucrats about the knowledge and skills of civil servants. Based on a transactional view of authority in bureaucratic politics, it argues that the terms of this expertise bargain are mutually defined by politicians and bureaucrats through a dynamic bargaining process. The analytical utility of the framework is demonstrated through a comparative‐historical analysis of contestation and change in bureaucratic expertise in the field of economic policy.

The role of experts and expert knowledge in policymaking has attracted growing public and academic attention. Scholarship on the topic has, however, remained deeply fragmented. It is discussed in separate silos of the literature – such as evidence-based policymaking, epistemic communities, and ideas and politics – and this has hindered sustained empirical study. This article argues that to stimulate more systematic research on the role that experts play in policymaking and develop a theoretical understanding of it, we need to foster dialogue across these literatures. To facilitate this, the article critically reviews how the role of expert knowledge in policymaking is conceptualised and explained in existing literatures, and offers suggestions about how to create common ground for future research by reframing research around the question of the influence of experts, and examining more closely the administrative underpinnings of expert influence.

AbstractAcademic interest in the administrative aspects of international organizations is on the rise. Yet, an issue that has received little attention is bureaucratic representation—the extent to which international bureaucracies are representative of the polity that they serve. The article theorizes the rationales for and forms of representative bureaucracy in international organizations by combining insights from the representative bureaucracy literature with the 'public service bargains' framework. It argues that bureaucratic representation is highly relevant in international organizations, given the diverse polity these organizations serve and their precarious legitimacy. It distinguishes three types of representational 'bargains' between international organizations and those they serve, centred on power, equal opportunities and diversity, and discusses under which conditions each type of bargain is likely to be struck. The argument contributes to discussions about representative bureaucracy in international organizations and to broader theoretical debates about international public administration.

What kind of professional experts dominate within the European Commission—lawyers, economists or others? Driven by the notion that the role of professional experts is shaped by organizational features, the article examines how different kinds of expertise are inscribed in the Commission's recruitment system and organizational structure. The analysis shows that while economics may have overtaken law as the most common educational background in the Commission, neither the recruitment system nor the departmental structure appears to encourage the development of economic expertise. The proportion of staff hired through economics competitions has dropped markedly, and there are few specialized units for economic analysis in the organization. More generally, the Commission's hiring policies and organizational hierarchy do not seem conducive to strong expert roles. The picture that emerges is that of an organization where expert knowledge is neither tied to a particular profession nor firmly rooted in the departmental structure.

Why did New Zealand adopt one of the most neoliberal tax systems in the world, whereas Ireland pursued a heterodox tax policy of low rates, deep deductions, and distortionary tax incentives? The diverging tax policy trajectories of these two small liberal market economies since 1980 are not well accounted for by conventional ideational, partisan, or political-institutional explanations. The article argues that the varying degree of neoliberal reform is better understood as the result of differences in the institutionalization of economic knowledge within the state. Distinct administrative institutions in New Zealand and Ireland gave rise to profound differences in the identities, expertise, economic ideas, and policy advice approach of tax policy bureaucrats, which had a major impact on tax policymaking in the two countries. Adapted from the source document.

Why did New Zealand adopt one of the most neoliberal tax systems in the world, whereas Ireland pursued a heterodox tax policy of low rates, deep deductions, and distortionary tax incentives? The diverging tax policy trajectories of these two small liberal market economies since 1980 are not well accounted for by conventional ideational, partisan, or political‐institutional explanations. The article argues that the varying degree of neoliberal reform is better understood as the result of differences in the institutionalization of economic knowledge within the state. Distinct administrative institutions in New Zealand and Ireland gave rise to profound differences in the identities, expertise, economic ideas, and policy advice approach of tax policy bureaucrats, which had a major impact on tax policymaking in the two countries.

AbstractNew Zealand moved further in neo-liberal tax reform than most other advanced economies over the last three decades. The article investigates this extreme case to address the question of what explains major neo-liberal economic reform. Comparing tax policy-making in two periods, the 1980s and 2008–10, we argue that neo-liberal tax reform in New Zealand is best understood as the product of "autonomous bureaucratic action". That is, bureaucratic organisations within the state independently formulated the goals and ideas for reform, took an activist role in policy-making and strongly influenced the policy preferences of ministers. Moreover, responding to a criticism often raised against state-centred theories, we offer an explicit explanation of bureaucratic preferences. We argue that bureaucratic goals and ideas were a product of how particular structural features of the bureaucracy – organisation and training – made ministries more or less receptive to new ideas within the economics discipline.

First published online: 21 November 2012 ; Why did New Zealand adopt one of the most neoliberal tax systems in the world, whereas Ireland pursued a heterodox tax policy of low rates, deep deductions, and distortionary tax incentives? The diverging tax policy trajectories of these two small liberal market economies since 1980 are not well accounted for by conventional ideational, partisan, or political-institutional explanations. The article argues that the varying degree of neoliberal reform is better understood as the result of differences in the institutionalization of economic knowledge within the state. Distinct administrative institutions in New Zealand and Ireland gave rise to profound differences in the identities, expertise, economic ideas, and policy advice approach of tax policy bureaucrats, which had a major impact on tax policymaking in the two countries.