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Thomas Christensen's previous title 1616: The World in Motion looked at a single year in the age of early maritime globalism--PW gave it a starred review, calling it "a stunning overview of the nascent modern world." By contrast his new gorgeously illustrated River of Ink ranges widely across time and cultures and offers what amounts to a magisterial history of literacy.The book's title refers to the sacking of Baghdad in 1258 when the Tigris ran black with the ink of books flung into the water by Mongol invaders. Other essays range from the writings of prehistoric Chinese cultures known only

The world of 1616 was a world of motion. Enormous galleons carrying silk and silver across the Pacific created the first true global economy, and the first international megacorporations were emerging as economic powers. In Europe, the deaths of Shakespeare and Cervantes marked the end of an era in literature, as the spirit of the Renaissance was giving way to new attitudes that would lead to the age of revolutions. Great changes were also taking place in East Asia, where the last native Chinese dynasty was entering its final years and Japan was beginning its long period of warrior rule. Artis

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Preface -- Note on Translation and Romanization -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Grand Strategy, National Political Power, and Two-Level Foreign Policy Analysis -- Chapter 3. Moderate Strategies and Crusading Rhetoric: Truman Mobilizes for a Bipolar World -- Chapter 4. Absent at the Creation: Acheson's Decision to Forgo Relations with the Chinese Communists -- Chapter 5. The Real Lost Chance in China: Nonrecognition, Taiwan, and the Disaster at the Yalu -- Chapter 6. Continuing Conflict over Taiwan: Mao, the Great Leap Forward, and the 1958 Quemoy Crisis -- Chapter 7. Conclusion -- Appendix A. American Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1950 -- Appendix B. Mao's Korean War Telegrams -- Bibliography -- Index

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two World Wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. Worse Than a Monolith demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy--combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries--divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of conflict, to prevent existing conlicts from escalating, and to negociate the end to those conflicts promptly.

The evolution of transnational production in the Asia-Pacific over the past few decades has been a force for peace. Critics of globalization and proponents of US-China economic decoupling advocate policies that would not only harm the global economy but would increase the likelihood of military conflict. This article focuses on the national security benefits of US-China economic engagement and the regional economic integration of East Asia. Government interventions to protect national security and build more resilience in supply chains are needed but should be limited in scope so as to avoid fundamental damage to the complex economic interdependence that has fostered growth and helped to deter war.

This article explores two starkly contrasting analytic approaches to assessing the performance of U.S. security strategy in East Asia since 1991: a positivesum approach, emphasizing the danger of security dilemmas and spirals of tension, and a zero-sum approach, emphasizing power competition and the long-term dangers posed by China's rise. In the policy world, the differences between these apparently irreconcilable perspectives are not so clear. Certain policies—for example, maintaining a strong U.S.-Japan alliance—flow from either logic. Moreover, each approach sometimes counsels counterintuitive policy prescriptions that are generally associated with the other. Relatively assertive U.S. security postures apparently have furthered positive-sum regional goals by catalyzing China to adopt reassuring policies toward its neighbors as a hedge against potential U.S. encirclement. From a zero-sum perspective, the United States often competes more effectively for regional influence by cooperating with China than it would by seeking to contain China's economic growth and diplomatic influence.

This article explores two starkly contrasting analytic approaches to assessing the performance of U.S. security strategy in East Asia since 1991: a positive sum approach, emphasizing the danger of security dilemmas and spirals of tension, and a zero-sum approach, emphasizing power competition and the long-term dangers posed by China's rise. In the policy world, the differences between these apparently irreconcilable perspectives are not so clear. Certain policies--for example, maintaining a strong U.S.-Japan alliance--flow from either logic. Moreover, each approach sometimes counsels counterintuitive policy prescriptions that are generally associated with the other. Relatively assertive U.S. security postures apparently have furthered positive-sum regional goals by catalyzing China to adopt reassuring policies toward its neighbors as a hedge against potential U.S. encirclement. From a zero-sum perspective, the United States often competes more effectively for regional influence by cooperating with China than it would by seeking to contain China's economic growth and diplomatic influence.