Suchergebnisse

The New Public Management includes the idea of incorporating market mechanisms in public sector governance. In the Danish case, market reforms have scarcely been used; private sector supplies of public services have not increased during the last decade. The lack of success of market reform in Denmark is explained by the strong institutions of traditional public sector governance operating at the micro‐level. Formal and informal hierarchy and formal and informal corporatism hold a strong grip on public sector governance. The very decentralized structure of the Danish public sector decreases the importance of central government in terms of reform strategies. Strong interests and institutional constraints keep reforms in the Danish public sector within a hierarchical mode of governance.

The original concept of the negotiated economy from the late 1970s provided some heuristic insights into significant developments of political, economic, and administrative processes. The later development of the concept has not brought the theory of the negotiated economy any further. This is a reply to an article published in SPS (Andersen et al. 1996) which responded to criticisms brought by me in an earlier article (1W.4). The defence of the theory of the negotiated economy is not consistent. The theory is both non‐positive and positive, and normally accepted criteria for empirical confrontation are not adhered to.

The concept of the negotiated economy intuitively catches important developments in state‐market relations. The fruitfulness of the recent development of the negotiated economy as a macro concept is questioned. Two theses deduced from the concept are tested against public regulation of the Danish manufacturing sector. Although regulatory demands on manufacturing firms have increased the complexity of the political environment of firms. the negotiated economy is not an adequate theoretical concept for describing and explaining the increased interdependence of state and market. The negotiated economy might be useful at the sector or sub‐sector level, but for empirical analysis the concept should be more precisely defined.

In its final report, the Danish Democracy and Power Study (1998–2004) pointed to a number of serious democratic problems such as declining political party membership, a growing gap between a competent and resourceful majority and a marginalised minority, the growing influence of the media, the transfer of power from the political to the judicial system, and the democratic deficit associated with European Union membership. However, the report also concluded that overall democratic development in the last 30–40 years has been surprisingly positive. This article assesses the development of democracy in Denmark in relation to the parliamentary chain of governance: the standard used in the final report of the majority of the Norwegian power study group. The conclusion is that, in the case of Denmark, democratic development has not – as the parliamentary committee initially expected – resulted in a systematic weakening of the parliamentary chain of governance.

The integration of organized interests into the formation and implementation of public policies is a core institutional trait of the Scandinavian countries. However, significant changes have taken place in the relations between organized interests and public authorities in Denmark and Norway during the last two decades. The use of traditional corporatist structures of interest intermediation has been reduced in favor of a corresponding increase in lobbyism. At the same time a marked increase in the frequency and intensity of contacts between organized interests and parliamentary actors has taken place. The shift in focus mirrors the increasing role played by the two parliaments in public policy formation and a less positive assessment of the outcomes of strongly institutionalized corporatist policy making by administrative decision makers.