Suchergebnisse

Spinoza's Argument for Substance Monism: Why There Is Only One Thing interprets and defends Spinoza's God/Nature argument using speculative metaphysics as a method and illustrates the practice and potential of metaphysics at work. These features work together to strengthen Spinoza's argument that only one substantial being exists.

Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Abbreviations/Acronyms -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: The United Kingdom: A Post-modern Maritime and Globalised Nation -- A Post-modern State? -- A Maritime Globalised State -- An Island-state -- Overseas Territories -- Shipbuilding -- Domestic Mercantile Marine -- Maritime London and the Maritime Services Sector -- A Maritime-dependent State -- Economic Well-being -- The Future of the Global Maritime Environment? -- Notes -- Chapter 2: The Attributes and Roles of Naval Forces -- The Roles/Functions of Navies

"What does it mean to say that a person has been educated? This question forms the basis of global education policy debates; from the way governments establish funding for national school systems, to the way children are treated in the classroom. Should there be a common ethical core to such polices? What kind of educational process should aboriginal groups in Labrador, Canada, have a moral right to, and should this process be different from what children in New York's boroughs have claim to? Should a school-based curriculum, such as the UK's National Curriculum, make well-being a central concern or are there other ethical dimensions to be addressed? Christopher Martin explores these questions and argues that the best way to consider them is to view education as a matter of public moral understanding. He brings together traditions of thought central to philosophy of education, such as R.S. Peters, and connects this tradition to the moral philosophy and critical theory of Jurgen Habermas, whose theory of Discourse Morality has previously been given little attention in education circles.--

Erickson and Thompson articulate and defend reasonableness as an important civic educational aim for early childhood education. In this response, I argue that further clarity regarding the nature and scope of "reasonableness" as an educational concept or idea is needed. Is such a concept fundamentally political, or does it capture a broader notion of educational value? My view is that, from an educational point of view, the need for reasonable deliberation in plural societies makes salient that there are certain situations that mature moral agents should be prepared to handle (i.e., conflict about basic political matters). But this is merely part of a broader moral education. To ignore this involves risks real downsides to an education for reasonableness. I explain why I think this is the case, pointing to some sharp differences between the nature of civic deliberation and moral deliberation, more broadly.