Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with sticky wages and sticky prices
In: International finance discussion papers 834
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In: International finance discussion papers 834
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 37, Heft 12, S. 2882-2912
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Journal of monetary economics, Band 54, Heft 6, S. 1809-1836
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5474
SSRN
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9291
SSRN
In: Journal of political economy, Band 131, Heft 5, S. 1372-1382
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of political economy, Band 120, Heft 5, S. 926-985
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: NBER Working Paper No. w17319
SSRN
In: Journal of monetary economics, Band 55, Heft 8, S. 1401-1414
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 94, S. 142-189
ISSN: 0165-1889
This paper characterizes long-run and short-run optimal fiscal policy in the labor selection framework. In a calibrated non-Ramsey decentralized equilibrium, labor market volatility is inefficient. Keeping fixed the structural parameters, the Ramsey government achieves efficient labor market volatility; doing so requires labor-income tax volatility that is orders of magnitude larger than the "tax-smoothing" results based on Walrasian labor markets, but a few times smaller than the results based on search and matching markets. We analytically characterize selection-model-consistent wedges and ine ciencies in order to understand optimal tax volatility.
BASE
This paper characterizes long-run and short-run optimal fiscal policy in the labor selection framework. In a calibrated non-Ramsey decentralized equilibrium, labor market volatility is inefficient. Keeping fixed the structural parameters, the Ramsey government achieves efficient labor market volatility; doing so requires labor-income tax volatility that is orders of magnitude larger than the "tax-smoothing" results based on Walrasian labor markets, but a few times smaller than the results based on search and matching markets. We analytically characterize selection-model-consistent wedges and inefficiencies in order to understand optimal tax volatility.
BASE
This paper characterizes long-run and short-run optimal fiscal policy in the labor selection framework. In a calibrated non-Ramsey decentralized equilibrium, labor market volatility is inefficient. Keeping fixed the structural parameters, the Ramsey government achieves efficient labor market volatility; doing so requires labor-income tax volatility that is orders of magnitude larger than the "tax-smoothing" results based on Walrasian labor markets, but a few times smaller than the results based on search and matching markets. We analytically characterize selection-model-consistent wedges and inefficiencies in order to understand optimal tax volatility.
BASE
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7120
SSRN
This paper characterizes long-run and short-run optimal fiscal policy in the labor selection framework. In a calibrated non-Ramsey decentralized equilibrium, labor market volatility is inefficient. Keeping fixed the structural parameters, the Ramsey government achieves efficient labor market volatility; doing so requires labor-income tax volatility that is orders of magnitude larger than the tax-smoothing results based on Walrasian labor markets, but a few times smaller than the results based on search and matching markets. We analytically characterize selection-modelconsistent wedges and inefficiencies in order to understand optimal tax volatility.
BASE