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This paper examined the management structure of Taiwan's business groups. The objective was to determine how independent group firms coordinate their business. Employing longitudinal data of the top 100 groups, I investigated the "inner circle" system and its evolution. I found that group leaders occupied overlapped positions at the director rather than at the manager level, which implied a separation of strategic planning and routine administration. Secondly, the dynamics of inner circle management did not hinge upon the group president as in the Korean chaebol, nor on the norm of corporate community as in the Japanese keiretsu, but on the social ties in the inner circle. Analyzing the background of the leaders indicated that family never dominated the scene even in the early years, and their significance decreased along with environmental changes. The transition in Taiwan in the late 1980s motivated business groups to introduce more "outside" talent into decision‐making.

In this paper, I demonstrate an alternative explanation to the development of the American electricity industry. I propose a social embeddedness approach (Granovetter, 1985, 1992) to interpret why the American electricity industry appears the way it does today, and start by addressing the following questions: Why is the generating dynamo located in well‐connected central stations rather than in isolated stations? Why does not every manufacturing firm, hospital, school, or even household operate its own generating equipment? Why do we use incandescent lamps rather than arc lamps or gas lamps for lighting? At the end of the nineteenth century, the first era of the electricity industry, all these technical as well as organizational forms were indeed possible alternatives. The centralized systems we see today comprise integrated, urban, central station firms which produce and sell electricity to users within a monopolized territory. Yet there were visions of a more decentralized electricity industry. For instance, a geographically decentralized system might have dispersed small systems based around an isolated or neighborhood generating dynamo; or a functionally decentralized system which included firms solely generating and transmitting the power, and selling the power to locally‐owned distribution firms (McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz, forthcoming). Similarly, the incandescent lamp was not the only illuminating device available at that time. The arc lamp was more suitable for large‐space lighting than incandescent lamps; and the second‐generation gas lamp ‐ Welsbach mantle lamp ‐ was much cheaper than the incandescent electric light and nearly as good in quality (Passer, 1953:196–197).

AbstractResearch Question/IssueDespite the importance of political ties to firm strategy and performance, little is known about why and how firms form political ties. This study examines how firm‐specific governance structures function as important determinants of the formation of political ties and how the impact of governance structures evolves during institutional transition of emerging economies.Research Findings/InsightsOur empirical analysis is based on a longitudinal data set involving manually coded political ties of listed firms in Taiwan between 1996 and 2005. We find that business group affiliation and family ownership facilitate the formation of political ties but that such effects diminish as market infrastructures and regulatory institutions develop.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study systematically examines how corporate governance structures affect the formation of political ties. It identifies an overlooked explanation for the dynamics of political ties that resides in the internal governance structures of firms. It contributes to the corporate governance research by demonstrating how governance structures other than the board of directors can provide resources to facilitate strategic actions such as political tie establishment. It also enriches research on corporate governance bundles by showing the interdependence among multilevel governance mechanisms in the context of political tie formation.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study offers insights for business executives interested in managing interdependence with government. While business group affiliates and family firms are better able to link to politicians, such advantages diminish during institutional transition. Hence, group leaders and family owners should consider other political activities to effectively manage political risks as institutions develop.

Using data on 290 business groups, this study examines how ties with rival political parties maintained by Taiwanese firms from 1998 through 2006 affected business strategies, specifically the unrelated diversification into new industries. Taiwan's recent democratization and emerging economy provide an ideal setting for studying the economic impact of firms' ties with rival political parties. By focusing on a firm's entire portfolio of ties instead of strictly dyadic business–government ties, we offer a novel model that demonstrates how the interplay of various ties affects a firm's strategy differently under different forms of government. Our analysis shows that under a united government, ties to the ruling party facilitate entries of business groups into unrelated industries, while ties to the opposition parties inhibit such moves. Portfolios of ties to both the ruling and opposition parties impose additional obstacles to market entry. Under a divided government, however, ties to the ruling party are conducive to market entry, and portfolios of ties to both the ruling party and the opposition party with legislative authority offer a further boost. Regardless of type of government, the effect of having a portfolio of political ties tends to be mitigated by a firm's internal resources and capabilities: a firm with sufficient resources and market entry experience has a better chance of achieving its goals even when a dominant political party withholds its support. Our study highlights the tradeoffs that politically connected firms confront in emerging economies with underdeveloped political and market institutions.

Business groups, the leading economic players in emerging economies, have responded to the market-oriented transition primarily through corporate restructuring. Agency theory predicts that acquisition and divestiture would serve the interests of dominant families and foreign investors in different ways. Further, dominant families, foreign investors from shareholder-based countries, and foreign investors from stakeholder-based countries each operate under distinct institutional logics of appropriate restructuring strategies. We test hypotheses about agency and institutional mechanisms using large business groups in Taiwan between 1986 and 1998 as our empirical example. We find that, consistent with both mechanisms, family-controlled business groups are less likely to divest of unrelated businesses. However, the institutional logics mechanism can better explain the relative lack of unrelated acquisition in family-controlled groups and the difference in divestiture between groups with more shareholder-based foreign investment and those with more stakeholder-based investment. Our study contributes to the neo-institutional perspective of corporate restructuring and strategic management in general by empirically separating the two mechanisms and examining organizational responses to conflicting institutional logics. Our study also adds to the understanding of business group restructuring in emerging economies.

This study examines the interaction between change-minded human agents and environmental and organizational contingencies to understand contested change in highly institutionalized practices. We propose a theory of how individuals, including those who are structurally highly embedded, can become change agents when confronted with amplified institutional contradictions. Using the empirical example of family presence in the leadership of Taiwanese business groups, we argue that despite the structural constraints on second-generation key leaders, these leaders are more likely to actualize their motivation to reduce family presence in the contexts of market-oriented transition and highly diversified business groups, and that key leaders with a management education from the United States are more likely to deviate from this institutionalized practice than are non-U.S.-educated key leaders, because they can transport ideas from different business models. A longitudinal analysis of the top 100 business groups in Taiwan between 1977 and 1998 largely supports our arguments. This study contributes to recent endeavors to understand antecedents to institutional change with an explicit focus on the interplay between agency and context, and to business-group research by examining the change of one foundational feature of the group form.

We examine the role of particularistic relationships (such as family and prior social ties) in business groups during institutional transition and test how particularistic ties between top leaders affect business group performance in Taiwan, where such ties have been central to the functioning of business groups. We propose that during market-oriented transition, family and prior social ties could improve group performance by providing informal norms that strengthen the intermediation within business groups and that family relationships could reduce strategic restructuring and generate performance benefits. Results of a longitudinal study over 24 years show that market transition enhanced the contribution of family and prior social relationships but not that of common-identity relationships, such as being from the same hometown, which do not involve prior direct personal contact. We also found that during transition, the positive contribution of family members would rise up to a threshold, after which additional family members tended to derail group performance, possibly due to informational disadvantages and a legitimacy discount in the eyes of foreign investors. The study helps to make sense of different predictions about the role of particularistic ties in business group performance and makes an initial attempt at revealing how social structure affects performance. Our findings have implications for research on the value of business groups in institutional transition, interorganizational relationships, and the contingencies of social relationships.

Despite increased attention given to family firms in the theory of organization and management, the value of family governance in emerging markets is not clearly understood. We draw insights from agency and institutional economics perspectives to address the debate on whether family governance fills or abuses the void left by weaker market and legal institutions. We propose a dual focus on the pattern of family control and weak institutions to reconcile these opposed assessments. We analyze how various combinations of family control over ownership, strategy, and operations yield different benefits and costs for the operational performance of firms in the absence of strong market and legal institutions. The uneven development of market institutions across industries and the impact of independent directors reinforce the importance of separating different patterns of family control. We find support for our hypotheses when tested on a data set consisting of all publicly listed firms in Taiwan between 1996 and 2005. Our study contributes to a deeper understanding of family businesses in emerging markets, highlights the importance of weak institutions in shaping relative agency costs, and illuminates the differential effects of independent directors.