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In this paper we develop a partial equilibrium model for agricultural sector to assess the impact of CEE integration with the EU on welfare and income distribution of agricultural factors. The modelling framework is based on the concept of market imperfections and transaction costs. We perform several policy simulations with different levels of direct payments as given in the most recent European Commission proposal. We find that even the most sceptical European Commission proposal of awarding the CEE farmers only 25% of the direct payments will increase welfare and income of farmers. However, the distribution of CAP rents are affected by the institutional structure. We find an adverse impact on allocation of incomes and welfare that are generated by the integration in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. The major part of it - between 65% to 93% - is transferred to owners of production factors, such as hired labour, landowners and variable capital suppliers, but not as desired to support farmer incomes. In Poland the gains resulting from the integration are allocated more favourably to farmers. Factor owners retain only around 24% to 61%, depending on the level of direct payments.

AbstractIn 2020, the European Union (EU) introduced the new Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategy, an innovative new strategy to make the EU food system sustainable. The review of the EU marketing standards for food products is implemented as part of the Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategy. While the deal provides an increased focus on sustainability, the new review of the marketing standards extends to factor in the potential impact of modifying the current standards on sustainability. This article identifies parts of the current marketing standards that may affect various aspects of sustainability and discusses the potential impact and trade‐offs with modifying these elements in the supply chain. To illustrate the implications of marketing standards for sustainability, we focus on three broad case studies: food waste, food chain innovation, and climate conscious consumers.

Recently, the EU Council adopted a new labour migration policy instrument - the EU Blue Cards (BC) - for attracting the highly skilled workers to the EU. The present paper examines the potential impacts, which BC may cause on less developed sending countries (LDC). Our results suggest that the EU BC will reduce human capital in LDC. In addition, BC will also have a negative impact on knowledge capital. These findings suggest that without appropriate policy responses, BC makes developing country growth prospects rather bleak than blue. Therefore, we propose and analyse alternative migration policy instruments for LDC. We find that policies implemented on the demand side of the skilled labour market are the most efficient. In contrast, policies that address the supply side of the skilled labour market are the least efficient, though they might be less costly to implement.

In 2009 the EU adopted a new migration policy instrument - the Blue Cards (BC) - for attracting highly skilled workers to the EU. The present paper examines the potential impacts, which BC may cause on the less developed sending countries (LDC). According to the adopted framework of innovative capital, the BC will reduce human capital in LDC. In addition, BC will also have a negative impact on knowledge capital. These findings suggest that the BC is not coherent with the EU's development policy. Without appropriate policy responses, BC fade the developing country growth prospects away. In order to address the skill drain issues, we propose and examine alternative migration policy options for the LDC.

This paper analyses income distribution effects of investment support granted under the EU Rural Development Policies (RDP). In the short-run and with perfect credit markets, the size of gains for farms depends on the extent to which investment additionality is enforced. If additionality is not enforced, farms gain an important share of the total support but do not have incentive to increase capital use. If additionality is enforced, gains for farms are lower and farms can even lose. With imperfect rural credit markets, farms would most likely prefer to increase capital use even without enforcement of investment additionality and total welfare increases. In the long-run farm benefits from this investment may be enhanced because of the multiplier effect. Introducing minimum thresholds as eligibility criteria may deter small farms from uptaking the investment support even if investment additionally is not enforced. Benefits from investment support are shared with capital suppliers. Gains of capital suppliers depend on the size of the capital supply elasticity and are conditional on the EU support to increase farm capital demand.

This study investigates the impact of the SAPS (Simplified Area Payment Scheme) on rental land values in seven New EU Member States (NMS). Using the FADN farm level panel data with 20,930 observations from 2004 and 2005 we are able to control for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and omitted variable bias, which often distort the incidence measures. According to our results, the SAPS has a positive and statistically significant impact on land rents in the NMS. However, the effect is smaller than theoretically predicted. Land rents capture only 0.19 of the marginal Euro of the SAPS. Taking into account the level of land renting in the NMS, around 10 percent of the total value of SAPS payments benefit non-farming land owners through higher farmland rental prices. Because the share of rented land is higher for corporate than for individual farms, family farms will likely benefit more from the SAPS than corporate farms.

Recently, the European Commission has proposed to introduce a new mi- gration policy instrument - Blue Cards - to attract highly skilled workers from abroad by lifting labour market restrictions, offering financial and housing ben- efits. The excludability character of human capital suggests that what is benefi- cial for receiving countries might be hfirmful for sending countries. This article investigates if and why high-skill migration in general and Blue Card scheme in particular might be hfirmful for sending countries. We find that the proposed Blue Card scheme makes the developing country growth prospects indeed blue. However, compared to other firms of labour migration, the upcoming Blue Card scheme is known well in advance. Analysing alternative policy options we show that, taking advantage of this ex-ante infirmation, targeted and timed policy interventions can minimise the adverse impacts of high-skill emigration. Thus, compared to other migration regimes Blue Cards are worse for sending countries, but they offer better opportunities for them to avoid the adverse impacts.