Introduction : how to study the politics of the European Neighbourhood Policy? -- ENP narratives : reproduction and reconstruction under crises -- Narratives and strategies of EU actors -- External responses and usages of ENP narratives -- Conclusion : politics, legitimacy and beyond.
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"This book examines the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the context of internal functions performed with regards to the European Union (EU) political system and its key actors. It argues that the ENP has been formulated not only in reaction to external challenges and threats, but also in response to EU internal legitimacy needs at systemic, institutional and actor level. Looking beyond governance approaches and the power of norms, this book follows a sociological approach to the politics of legitimation. Using Bourdieu's field theory, it bridges the rationalist-constructivist divide inherent in much of the ENP scholarship. While analysing articulations of EU institutions in terms of narrative production, reproduction and reconstruction, it sheds valuable light on where the conflicting goals, ambiguity and incoherence stem from. By highlighting third countries' responses and usages of ENP narratives for domestic and international legitimacy-seeking, the book calls for a more outside-in perspective on EU foreign policy. With the European integration project being increasingly contested, both internally and externally, this book provides a timely focus on the topic of legitimation and delegitimation dynamics with regards to EU foreign policy. This book is of key interest to scholars and students of European integration, EU Foreign Policy, and more broadly EU Studies and International Relations"--
This article seeks to investigate the birth and evolution of the European Political Community – a pan-European multilateral coordination format that has emerged at the initiative of France and in reaction to the Russian full-scale military aggression in Ukraine. The analysis draws on official speeches, think-tank briefs, and the Author's participatory observation conducted during international expert meetings held in early 2023. It is argued that the EPC is still a "moving target" in the early stage of development, where both its objectives and structure are not yet fully defined. From a Polish perspective, it has so far sent a key strategic message to Russia and can serve as a vehicle to re-engage with the United Kingdom or Turkey. But it should not be used as yet another ENP-style waiting room for candidates seeking EU membership.
This article seeks to grasp the current dynamic of the European Union's enlargement policy as shaped by the exogenous shock of the Russian full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. It argues that external pressures matter as windows of opportunity, but the precise nature of the EU's response to this geopolitical push is shaped by internal factors. Building on a recent work by Frank Schimmelfennig (2021), it further argues that the new enlargement dynamic can be usefully illuminated by the concept of bordering. More concretely, this research highlights external de-bordering and re-bordering strategies pursued by the relevant political actors within the EU, as they purposefully seek to use the geopolitical window of opportunity to transform existing bordering constellations in line with their preferences. Empirically, this article sheds light on Europe's border-based games while drawing an analytical line between de-bordering and re-bordering strategies. The analysis reveals the limits of de-bordering, even under geopolitical and security emergency, but also underlines opportunities for agency.
Women seem strangely absent in the process of European integration, or rather, in the dominant narratives that shape our understanding of how a united Europe was created. The historiography of European integration is populated by founding fathers, but there are hardly any founding mothers in sight. Drawing on the famous essay by feminist art historian Linda Nochlin (Why have there been no great women artists? 1971), this article makes a threefold contribution to the literature: first, it outlines the pitfalls of the feminist urge to '(re)discover' women; second, it investigates the 'founding fathers' as a social construct; and, finally, it highlights the key role of institutional opportunity structures for women's participation in politics.
This article introduces the special section entitled Westlessness or the Decline of the West 2.0? Whereas the concept of the West remains a moving target and requires the Other – the Rest to exist and thrive, it does organize both global power relations and the way we think about them. Thus the 'decline of the West' is not only about material realities, but also about de-legitimizing practices and discourses produced by strategically-acting actors both outside and within the West itself. Whereas Westlessness in the World refers to the weakening ability of shaping the Rest, Westlessness in the West denotes contestation and hollowing-out of the liberal rules of the game in the very centre of the West: the us and the European Union. The question remains as to whether COVID-19 pandemic brings "more of the same", while amplifying existing trends, or whether it provides for a transformation impulse and possibly Western revival.
This article conceptually draws on Bourdieu's field theory and Goffman's stigma theory to explain the evolution of Polish government's official narrative on European integration. Narrative production by Polish authorities reveals a marked shift in strategy adopted to deal with the stigma (real or imagined) that structures Poland's position in the EU field of power: from adaptive (corrective) to contesting strategy where stigma is embraced and transformed into a virtue. Empirically, this shift is illustrated with 3 examples of narrative production under crisis: 1) euro-zone crisis (Poland adapts to the dominant EU narrative and promotes its own austerity experience, while allying itself with the northern "saints" against the southern "sinners"); 2) migration crisis (Poland moves from adaptation to contestation, while narrating the "lack of solidarity" stigma as the responsible "normal"); 3) rule of law crisis (Poland consolidates its contestation strategy, while framing the dispute as a counter-measure from undemocratic EU centre to discipline "real" democrats in the periphery). Thus the narrative moves from contestation of a particular policy solution (migration quotas) to undermining normative bases of the European integration process.
This article conceptually draws on Bourdieu's field theory and Goffman's stigma theory to explain the evolution of Polish government's official narrative on European integration. Narrative production by Polish authorities reveals a marked shift in strategy adopted to deal with the stigma (real or imagined) that structures Poland's position in the EU field of power: from adaptive (corrective) to contesting strategy where stigma is embraced and transformed into a virtue. Empirically, this shift is illustrated with 3 examples of narrative production under crisis: 1) euro-zone crisis (Poland adapts to the dominant EU narrative and promotes its own austerity experience, while allying itself with the northern "saints" against the southern "sinners"); 2) migration crisis (Poland moves from adaptation to contestation, while narrating the "lack of solidarity" stigma as the responsible "normal"); 3) rule of law crisis (Poland consolidates its contestation strategy, while framing the dispute as a counter-measure from undemocratic EU centre to discipline "real" democrats in the periphery). Thus the narrative moves from contestation of a particular policy solution (migration quotas) to undermining normative bases of the European integration process. ; W wymiarze koncepcyjnym artykuł czerpie z teorii pola Bourdieu i teorii stygmatyzacji Goffmana w celu wyjaśnienia ewolucji oficjalnej narracji polskiego rządu w odniesieniu do integracji europejskiej. Analiza produkcji narracji przez rząd RP ukazuje znaczące przesunięcie w zakresie strategii radzenia sobie ze stygmatyzacją (faktyczną lub wyobrażoną), która określa pozycję Polski w unijnym polu władzy: od strategii adaptacyjnej (korekcyjnej) do strategii kontestacyjnej, gdzie stygmatyzowany atrybut ulega przekształceniu w cnotę. W wymiarze empirycznym owo przesunięcie zilustrowano 3 przykładami produkcji narracji w warunkach kryzysu: 1) kryzys strefy euro (Polska adaptuje się do dominującej w UE narracji i promuje własne doświadczenie polityki oszczędności, sprzymierzając się ze "świętymi" z Północy przeciwko "grzesznikom" z Południa); 2) kryzys migracyjny (Polska przechodzi od adaptacji do kontestacji, przekształcając stygmatyzowany "brak solidarności" w odpowiedzialną "normalność"); 3) kryzys rządów prawa (Polska konsoliduje strategię kontestacji, konstruując zaistniały konflikt w kategoriach kontrataku niedemokratycznego unijnego centrum na "prawdziwych" demokratów z peryferii UE). Narracja ewoluuje zatem od kontestacji konkretnego rozwiązania politycznego (kwoty migrantów) do podważenia normatywnych podstaw procesu integracji europejskiej.
This article conceptually draws on Bourdieu's field theory and Goffman's stigma theory to explain the evolution of Polish government's official narrative on European integration. Narrative production by Polish authorities reveals a marked shift in strategy adopted to deal with the stigma (real or imagined) that structures Poland's position in the EU field of power: from adaptive (corrective) to contesting strategy where stigma is embraced and transformed into a virtue. Empirically, this shift is illustrated with 3 examples of narrative production under crisis: 1) euro-zone crisis (Poland adapts to the dominant EU narrative and promotes its own austerity experience, while allying itself with the northern "saints" against the southern "sinners"); 2) migration crisis (Poland moves from adaptation to contestation, while narrating the "lack of solidarity" stigma as the responsible "normal"); 3) rule of law crisis (Poland consolidates its contestation strategy, while framing the dispute as a counter-measure from undemocratic EU centre to discipline "real" democrats in the periphery). Thus the narrative moves from contestation of a particular policy solution (migration quotas) to undermining normative bases of the European integration process. ; W wymiarze koncepcyjnym artykuł czerpie z teorii pola Bourdieu i teorii stygmatyzacji Goffmana w celu wyjaśnienia ewolucji oficjalnej narracji polskiego rządu w odniesieniu do integracji europejskiej. Analiza produkcji narracji przez rząd RP ukazuje znaczące przesunięcie w zakresie strategii radzenia sobie ze stygmatyzacją (faktyczną lub wyobrażoną), która określa pozycję Polski w unijnym polu władzy: od strategii adaptacyjnej (korekcyjnej) do strategii kontestacyjnej, gdzie stygmatyzowany atrybut ulega przekształceniu w cnotę. W wymiarze empirycznym owo przesunięcie zilustrowano 3 przykładami produkcji narracji w warunkach kryzysu: 1) kryzys strefy euro (Polska adaptuje się do dominującej w UE narracji i promuje własne doświadczenie polityki oszczędności, sprzymierzając się ze "świętymi" z Północy przeciwko "grzesznikom" z Południa); 2) kryzys migracyjny (Polska przechodzi od adaptacji do kontestacji, przekształcając stygmatyzowany "brak solidarności" w odpowiedzialną "normalność"); 3) kryzys rządów prawa (Polska konsoliduje strategię kontestacji, konstruując zaistniały konflikt w kategoriach kontrataku niedemokratycznego unijnego centrum na "prawdziwych" demokratów z peryferii UE). Narracja ewoluuje zatem od kontestacji konkretnego rozwiązania politycznego (kwoty migrantów) do podważenia normatywnych podstaw procesu integracji europejskiej.
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest identyfikacja, analiza i ocena skuteczności strategii rządu RP w sporze o praworządność z Komisją Europejską (2016–2018), z uwzględnieniem szerszego kontekstu politycznego w Unii Europejskiej. Hipoteza główna stanowi, że do momentu uruchomienia przez Komisję procedury z art. 7.1 TUE w grudniu 2017 roku, strategiczne cele rządu koncentrowały się na poziomie krajowym (mobilizacja krajowego poparcia), a nie na poziomie europejskim (minimalizacja strat i rozwiązanie sporu). Słabości strategii na poziomie europejskim należy upatrywać w błędnych założeniach i błędnej diagnozie ośrodka decyzyjnego w Polsce co do sytuacji politycznej w Europie oraz co do logiki gry politycznej w UE.
FEUTURE EU 28 Country Report Poland The general orientation of Poland's European policy under all governments was to support further enlargement of the European Union (EU). This approach was well reflected in the Polish foreign policy priorities 2012-2016 (March 2012), where Poland's European policy was characterized with notions: competitiveness, solidarity and openness, the latter understood as continuing the enlargement process. Support for Turkish membership in the EU has been consistently voiced as part of this general strategic orientation. ; This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein