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Stress testing is a useful and increasingly popular, yet sometimes misunderstood, method of analyzing the resilience of financial systems to adverse events. This paper aims to help demystify stress tests, and illustrate their strengths and weaknesses. Using an Excel-based exercise with institution-by-institution data, readers are walked through stress testing for credit risk, interest rate and exchange rate risks, liquidity risk and contagion risk, and are guided in the design of stress testing scenarios. The paper also describes the links between stress testing and other analytical tools, suc

The relative financial strength of Islamic banks is assessed empirically based on evidence covering individual Islamic and commercial banks in 18 banking systems with a substantial presence of Islamic banking. We find that (i) small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than small commercial banks; (ii) large commercial banks tend to be financially stronger than large Islamic banks; and (iii) small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than large Islamic banks, which may reflect challenges of credit risk management in large Islamic banks. We also find that the market shar

This paper contributes to the analysis of monetary policy in the face of financial instability. In particular, we extend the standard new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices to include a financial system. Our simulations suggest that if financial instability affects output and inflation with a lag and if the central bank has privileged information about credit risk, monetary policy that responds instantly to increased credit risk can trade off more output and inflation instability today for a faster return to the trend than a policy that follows the

We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter