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How does the hawkish or dovish nature of the domestic opposition in one state influence its own, as well as an international opponent's, negotiating behavior? I show that doves, when negotiating in the presence of a hawkish opposition, have more bargaining leverage in international negotiations. The key is to understand an international opponent's preference to deal with a dove rather than a hawk in future negotiations. I argue that adversaries have an incentive to concede more in negotiations to doves in order to sustain them in office, because failing to give concessions may lead to their replacement by less conciliatory (more hawkish) governments in the future. For this reason, doves are more likely than hawks to extract critical concessions from adversaries. The empirical results support this argument, which altogether suggests that doves are more successful in international negotiations not because they are more conciliatory, but rather because, for domestic reasons, they have greater bargaining leverage to extract counter-concessions from adversaries. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

How does the hawkish or dovish nature of the domestic opposition in one state influence its own, as well as an international opponent's, negotiating behavior? I show that doves, when negotiating in the presence of a hawkish opposition, have more bargaining leverage in international negotiations. The key is to understand an international opponent's preference to deal with a dove rather than a hawk in future negotiations. I argue that adversaries have an incentive to concede more in negotiations to doves in order to sustain them in office, because failing to give concessions may lead to their replacement by less conciliatory (more hawkish) governments in the future. For this reason, doves are more likely than hawks to extract critical concessions from adversaries. The empirical results support this argument, which altogether suggests that doves are more successful in international negotiations not because they are more conciliatory, but rather because, for domestic reasons, they have greater bargaining leverage to extract counter-concessions from adversaries.

Despite its theoretical and empirical importance, no studies to date have examined the deterrent value of democratic allies. To fill this void, this study concentrates precisely on this issue. The general premise is that challengers select targets based on their expectations about the reliability of their allies. These expectations are, in turn, based on the magnitude of political costs that an ally's leader would pay for failing to honor its international commitments. In democracies, the domestic audience would punish a leader for failing to defend an ally, but only if they care about the issue at stake. For this reason, I argue that democratic allies only effectively deter challenges against those partners that are of a greater strategic importance. In the absence of such strong interests, targets with democratic allies are more likely to be challenged. I find strong support for this argument in a quantitative test from 1816 to 2002. This study also suggests that the findings from previous tests of democratic alliance reliability may need to be interpreted through the lenses of sample selection bias. Challengers initiate disputes when democratic allies have low interests, suggesting the potential for a biased sample that primarily includes the most unreliable democratic allies. Adapted from the source document.

This study re-examines the link between democratization and international conflict. It is founded on the argument that the greatest threat to a democratizing incumbent's tenure arises from the ability of the old authoritarian elite or their supporters to overthrow the new regime for failed foreign policies. Given this framework, the article differentiates among transitioning states based on the strength of the old authoritarian leadership vis-à-vis the new democratic government. The institutional and political balance between the transitional forces and the remnants of the ancien régime is, in turn, considered a function of the legacies of past democratic and authoritarian rule. Leaders in redemocratizing states, and those with a longer legacy of previous democratic rule, should be more likely to initiate disputes, as they are more institutionally insulated from the old authoritarian elite. On the other hand, a stronger legacy of authoritarian rule is expected to lead to a more cautious foreign policy. These expectations are tested in a quantitative analysis of international dispute behavior for all democratizing states from 1950 to 1990. The results strongly confirm the hypotheses, lending validity to the theoretical explanation in this study that attributes differences among democratizing states in their conflict propensities to their institutional past.