Suchergebnisse

A number of studies have shown that men and women hold dissimilar opinions on a variety of issues. While we have been cognizant of the existence of the gender gap, none of the extant research examines the extent to which these differences are a consequence of period and cohort effects simultaneously. Cohort and period explanations are central to how scholars theorize large-scale changes in public opinion. This study uses a multilevel approach—employing cross-classified random effects models—to explore the underpinnings of gender differences on social and cultural issues (such as social welfare opinions, gender roles, sexuality, abortion, racial equality, and crime- and justice-related attitudes) stemming from the replacement of individuals or because men and women are changing how they think. The advantage is that this approach encourages an effort to examine the relative impact of compositional and contextual factors over time and across birth cohorts and assesses the consequences of how changes in these factors affect some of our most fundamental hypotheses about the origins of a gendered culture war.

This study investigates trends in social capital in the United States since the 1970s. The literature suggests that variations in social capital are associated with both individual attributes and macro-level economic conditions. Yet, others argue that after controlling for these features, large-scale changes in social capital are evident across birth cohorts and over time. While previous studies have identified a number of individual and societal factors that influence social capital, I note that the common modeling approach used is inappropriate for examining the interaction between national and individual-level data as well as the simultaneous influence of period- and cohort-based effects. I therefore utilize a multilevel model to reassess the different theories of the origins and determinants of social capital. The evidence presented casts doubt on past studies that see a general erosion in social capital as well as those that view the decline as stemming from generational replacement.

AbstractThe psychological security index is an important predictor of democratic norm support. However, insufficient attention has been paid to the separate but independent contributions of dogmatism, self-esteem, and trust, the three components typically combined to create that index. Thus, we do not know the unique influence of these components on democratic norm commitment. We also do not know the exact nature of the influence of the multiple dimensions of religion (belief, belonging, behavior) on the separate psychological security components. Using structural equation modeling and two national surveys, we examine the religion-psychological security-democratic norm support relationship. Our findings do not fully support a negative association between religion and democratic values. In fact, no matter the influence of religious belief, belonging, or behavior on psychological security, the mediating link of psychological security to democratic norm support is what is most important. Indeed, any differences that manifest as a consequence of the various dimensions of religion disappear in the religion-psychological security-democratic norm support linkage. As such, anti-democratic values are a product of one's psychological attributes and are almost entirely unrelated to one's religion. Further, our findings challenge the theoretical underpinnings of the psychological security index, as we find little evidence that the separate components used to construct the composite measure, particularly trust, are an appropriate proxy for authoritarianism.

AbstractThis research focuses on the variable "psychological security" as a mediating influence for religion, and its influence on political tolerance. While the composite variable of "psychological security" (typically measured by dogmatism, self-esteem, and trust) has been part of many studies of political tolerance, insufficient attention has been paid to the influence of these separate indicators. This is problematic because certain religious beliefs, practices, and/or affiliations may contribute differentially to the particular components of psychological security that are linked with greater political intolerance. So, we do not know "if" and "how" religion may influence these separate psychological security components or the mediating influence of these components in the religionpsychological security-political tolerance connection. The objective of this project is to "unpack" the unique influence of the psychological security components in our understanding of political tolerance and to assess the mediating influence of these same components on the relationship between religion and tolerance.

Although mass opinion on many political issues is generally stable, Americans' beliefs about environmentalism have undergone dramatic changes in recent decades. Many studies of attitudinal change identify cohort- or period-based effects as contributing to large-scale opinion changes. However, limited research exists that considers both explanations simultaneously. This study estimates variability in environmental spending support across cohort and periods while also testing the role of compositional and contextual causes of this variability. Our findings contribute to understanding mass opinion change, as well as variations in the American public's concern about the environment. Furthermore, the modeling approach addresses the question of which macro- and micro-level characteristics are influential for pushing forward a green agenda. The evidence presented casts doubt on studies that see pro-environmentalism as dependent on personal or national wealth as well as findings that view shifts in concern as stemming from generational replacement. Yet, among the major explanations identified in public opinion research, we find support for elite cues and, to a lesser degree, subjective economic security as important factors that drive shifts in public concern about the environment. Given these results, we argue that theories of postmaterialist environmentalism and theories of global environmentalism are incomplete on their own.

Previous research demonstrates that religion plays a significant role in understanding attitudes and behavior regarding the environment. In addition, studies also demonstrate value change across cohorts and time in postmaterialist attitudes. However, limited empirical evidence exists that considers both simultaneously. The advantage of the approach relied on here is that the model can estimate "true" change in "proenvironmental" attitude levels within each religious group by cohort and period while also testing the role of compositional effects on these trends. Our analyses demonstrate that support for environmental spending is the result of period effects rather than cohort-based change. Moreover, although support for environmental spending differs among religious denominations, changes are the result of periodic shifts that are experienced by all denominations. Thus, without any unique denominational shifts in support for environmental spending, the so-called "greening" of Christianity is not supported here.

AbstractStudies of citizens' satisfaction with democracy have established a connection between satisfaction and how well those citizens' preferred parties perform in elections. Yet, the question remains whether 'winners' and 'losers' respond to the same system- and party-level factors when evaluating their political satisfaction. We build on extant literature to consider citizen satisfaction with democracy from the perspective of character valence. Using the Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file and content analysis-based data on parties' character valence, we find that both winners' and losers' satisfaction with the political system is affected by parties' character valence, but in differing (and somewhat surprising) ways. We find that winners respond to improvements in the character valence of opposition parties, whereas losers demonstrate greater concern with the valence of governing parties.