Forward planning and stability of the Australian migration program
In: Discussion papers
In: Series A 95.01
22 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Discussion papers
In: Series A 95.01
In: Discussion papers
In: Series A 95.03
In: Discussion papers
In: Series A 95.02
In: Discussion papers
In: Series A 95.07
In: Discussion papers
In: Series A 95.05
In: Economics and commerce discussion papers 21/92
In: Economics and commerce discussion papers 15/91
In: Economics and commerce discussion papers 12/91
In: Economics and commerce discussion papers 13/91
In: Economics discussion papers 25/88
In: Australian journal of public administration, Band 54, Heft 4, S. 543-555
ISSN: 1467-8500
Abstract: This paper examines policy arguments for further restricting supply to the Australian General Practice profession by immigration and medical school policies. It uses economic analysis to assess the costs and benefits of supply restrictions. The effects of Medicare and GP income‐targeting on policy design are analysed. Restrictions are shown to impose net costs on the community as a whole and on government. Even with Medicare subsidies, the inefficiency costs of the current health system are minimised with liberal policies for accepting foreign‐ trained GPs.
In: Australian journal of public administration: the journal of the Royal Institute of Public Administration Australia, Band 54, Heft 4, S. 543-555
ISSN: 0313-6647
In: International migration review: IMR, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 338-354
ISSN: 0197-9183
Der Autor diskutiert in seinem Beitrag die Rolle der Kosten für eine Konjunkturbelebung und die Kosten einer multikulturellen Politik als mögliche Grundlagen für eine Einwanderungsgebühr. (IAB)
In: International migration review: IMR, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 338-354
ISSN: 1747-7379, 0197-9183
With a perfectly elastic supply of immigrants and no domestic distortions, the pure Pareto gains to residents from immigration are maximized by an open door immigration policy. The only role then for entry charges is cost recovery. With inelastic supply, charges may be levied for optimal tariff reasons although there are practical difficulties in estimating appropriate supply elasticities. Priceable externalities provide a rationale for charging if, and only if, there are difficulties in making discriminatory reimbursements of optimal toll revenues to residents. Otherwise, relevant externalities should be internalized via appropriate Pigovian taxes and discriminatory reimbursements paid to residents. Then, an open door policy without entry charges should be pursued. Transaction costs and unpriceable externalities provide a weak case for charging. Where quotas are imposed for political reasons or to ease potentially unfavorable distributional implications, there are convincing second-best arguments for fees and, equivalently, quota auctions. The latter policies are generally preferable to unpriced quotas and to asset tests, even if coupled with a fee, whatever the degree of international capital mobility. Independently of humanitarian concerns, liberal immigration policies can be based on the self-interest of residents provided immigrants pay all costs they impose on a resident population.