Suchergebnisse

"Corporate governance developed to maintain the accountability, stability and performance of corporations. It is evolving due to concern not just the financial health of the company, but its social and environmental impact. There is considerable international institutional diversity in corporate governance. The role and significance of market institutions varies among different governance systems. This work provides a concise insight into the defining impulses of late 20th and early 21st century corporate governance through a series of competing epoch-making paradigmatic contests. The present paradigm highlights a shift towards corporate sustainability involving the corporate delivery of long-term value in financial, social, environmental and ethical terms. In analysing the purpose of the company and the definition of value creation, the hegemony of agency theory and shareholder primacy is challenged. More expansive theoretical explanations are considered which recognise the deeper values companies are built upon, the wider purposes they serve, and the broader set of relationships they depend upon for their success. This book will be of value to researchers, scholars and students in corporate governance, sustainability, business and accounting subjects. Managers, professionals and other general business readers will also find this text of interest"--

Acknowledgements -- Dedication -- Foreword to the first edition -- Preface to the second edition -- Cycles of governance -- Boards and directors : the political mechanisms of corporate governance -- Finance, law and markets : the institutional elements of corporate governance -- Anglo-American corporate governance -- European corporate governance -- Asia-Pacific corporate governance -- Corporate governance in the emerging economies -- The globalisation of corporate governance -- Corporate social responsibility -- Corporate sustainability -- Appendix: -- Enron-era : case studies -- Enron -- Worldcom -- HIH insurance -- Parmalat -- Global financial crisis case studies -- Lehman Brothers -- Royal Bank of Scotland -- UBs -- Iceland -- Asia-Pacific case studies -- Satyam -- Olympus -- Corporate responsibility and sustainability case studies -- James Hardie -- BP -- Volkswagen -- Index

Intro -- Introduction: Privatising the World? -- Part I. International Privatisation Policy -- Chapter 1. The Internationalisation of Privatisation -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Growth of Public Ownership -- 1.3 The Challenge to Public Ownership -- 1.4 Explaining the Spread of Privatisation: Prevailing Orthodoxies, Received Wisdom and the Policy Community -- 1.5 Explaining the Spread of Privatisation: The Role of International Institutions in Developed Countries -- 1.6 Explaining the Spread of Privatisation: The Role of International Institutions in Developing and Former Socialist Countries -- 1.7 The Case of Electricity -- 1.8 Conclusions -- Chapter 2. The Legal Techniques of Privatisation -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Common Problems -- 2.3 Changes of Ownership, Activities, and Assets -- 2.4 Transformation and Liquidation -- 2.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 3. Privatization and "Popular Capitalism": The Case of Japan -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Case of Zaibatsu Dissolution -- 3.3 Dispersion of Frozen Shares -- 3.4 Case of NTT (Nihon Telegraph & Telephone) -- 3.5 Illusion of "Popular Capitalism" -- Part II. The Retreat of the State in the Advanced Industrial Economies -- Chapter 4. Privatization American Style: The "Grand Illusion" -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Privatization and Economic Performance -- 4.3 Privatization and Deficit Reduction -- 4.4 Privatization and Economic Growth -- 4.5 Privatization and Union Power -- 4.6 Privatization and "Popular Capitalism" -- 4.7 Conclusion -- Chapter 5. Privatising State Owned Housing -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Privatisations -- 5.3 Preconditions for Extensive Privatisation? -- 5.4 Council House Sales -- 5.5 Evaluating the Effects of Policy -- 5.6 What has been Sold and Where? -- 5.7 Who Buys? -- 5.8 Gainers and Losers -- 5.9 Other Aspects -- 5.10 The Context for Housing Privatisation -- 5.11 Conclusions.

AbstractIt is now 50 years since Milton Friedman set out his doctrine that "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." This paper seeks to add fresh and compelling new evidence of why Lynn Stout was correct in her resolute critique of the thesis of shareholder primacy at the heart of the Friedman doctrine, and how this doctrine remains profoundly damaging to the corporations that continue to uphold this belief. It is argued that the Friedman doctrine has had a catastrophic impact upon American business and society beginning with General Motors failure to respond to investor calls for increased concern for safety and pollution at the time of Friedman's intervention in 1970, stretching all the way to the recent fatal errors of Boeing in placing a higher priority in getting the new Boeing 737 MAX into the market than ensuring the soundness of software controls on the flight deck which led to two horrific plane crashes in 2018 and 2019 with the loss of 346 lives. These tragic errors in corporate judgement are ultimately related to the constricted sense of corporate purpose imposed by Milton Friedman and taken up with enthusiasm by agency theorists focused upon maximising shareholder value. This reckless single-mindedness has privileged the pursuit of the narrowest of financial measures of performance above fundamentals including passenger safety and environmental emissions controls. As a result, innocent lives have been lost, brands have been tarnished, and ultimately the strategic future of significant corporations endangered, and the ecology of the planet imperilled. There is now emerging a new sense of the purpose of the corporation that defines a rationale for corporate social and environmental responsibility in a way similar to Lynn Stout's more inclusive stakeholder approach. The question remains open whether this will lead to the development of fiduciary duties, governance, strategies, targets, measures, transparency and disclosure that might deliver the sustainable corporation.

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of corporate governance through a series of changing paradigms in response to wider transformations in the political economy, business and society. The different eras of governance, and the dominant theoretical and practical paradigms are highlighted. In a context where the adequacy of the dominant paradigms of corporate governance is increasingly challenged, the search for coherent new paradigms is a vital task in corporate governance.Design/methodology/approach– This paper is a conceptual analysis of evolving paradigms in corporate governance.Findings– To meet the imminent challenge of social and environmental sustainability in a post-carbon economy, further rethinking of corporate purpose, corporate governance and directors duties will be essential. This sustainability revolution has only just commenced, but in the course of the twenty-first century, it will transform both business and society.Research limitations/implications– The implications of the research concern the importance of conceptualising corporate governance through different eras and paradigms, and appreciating that further paradigm shifts will occur in response to transformations in the political economy and ecology.Practical implications– This paper informs on the importance of the transformation of business purpose and objectives in response to the imminent dangers of environmental and social collapse.Social implications– This paper emphasises the social and environmental dimensions of corporate activity, and how these must be considered in the definition of wealth generation.Originality/value– The contribution of this paper is to focus upon the increasing integration of corporate governance and corporate sustainability, and how this is essential for the reformulation of corporate purpose and objectives.

Corporate governance crisis and reform is essentially cyclical. Waves of corporate governance reform and increased regulation occur during periods of recession, corporate collapse and re‐examination of the viability of regulatory systems. During long periods of expansion, active interest in the conformance aspects of governance diminishes, as companies and shareholders become again more concerned with the generation of wealth, rather than in ensuring governance mechanisms are working appropriately for the retention of wealth, and its use for agreed purposes. This cyclical historical saga revolves around the enduring agency and stewardship dilemmas of governance. Complacency concerning corporate governance during confident times compounds ensuing crises. Such dilemmas are universal in market systems, though internationally with different systems of corporate governance the unwinding of this saga has occurred at different times, for different reasons, and with different consequences. Corporate governance is about wealth generation and risk management, and these duties require continuous and simultaneous performance. Avoiding mandatory restrictive over‐regulation requires active market regulation, particularly at times of expansion. The drive to make corporate governance both improve corporate performance and enhance corporate accountability will continue.