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AbstractInternational migrants who seek protection also participate in the economy. Thus the policy of the United States to drastically reduce refugee and asylum-seeker arrivals from 2017 to 2020 might have substantial and ongoing economic consequences. This paper places conservative bounds on those effects by critically reviewing the research literature. It goes beyond prior estimates by including ripple effects beyond the wages earned or taxes paid directly by migrants. The sharp reduction in US refugee admissions starting in 2017 costs the overall US economy today over $9.1 billion per year ($30,962 per missing refugee per year, on average) and costs public coffers at all levels of government over $2.0 billion per year ($6,844 per missing refugee per year, on average) net of public expenses. Large reductions in the presence of asylum seekers during the same period likewise carry ongoing costs in the billions of dollars per year. These estimates imply that barriers to migrants seeking protection, beyond humanitarian policy concerns, carry substantial economic costs.

Many governments seek to reduce emigration from low-income countries by encouraging economic development there. A large literature, however, observes that average emigration rates are higher in countries with sustained increases in GDP per capita than in either chronically poor countries or established rich countries. This suggests an emigration life cycle in which average emigration first rises, then falls with development. But this hypothesis has not been tested with global datasets controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between countries. This paper finds that emigration rises on average as GDP per capita initially rises in poor countries, slowing after roughly US$5,000 at purchasing power parity, and reversing after roughly $10,000. Before this reversal, the within-country elasticity of rising emigration prevalence to rising GDP per capita is +0.35 to all destinations, and +0.74 to rich destinations. This relationship between emigration flows and economic growth is highly robust to country and time effects (fixed or random), specification (linear, log, nonparametric), emigration measure (stock or flow), country subsamples (rich destinations, large origins), and historical period (1960-2019 or 1850-1914). Decomposition of channels for this relationship highlight the joint importance of demographic transition, education investment, and structural change, but question a large role for transportation costs or policy barriers.

AbstractSkilled workers emigrate from developing countries in rising numbers, raising fears of a drain on the human and financial resources of the countries they leave. This paper critiques existing policy proposals to address the development effects of skilled migration. It then proposes a new kind ofex antepublic-private agreement to link skill formation and skilled migration for the mutual benefit of origin countries, destination countries, and migrants: 'Global Skill Partnerships'. The paper describes how such an agreement might work in one profession (nursing) and one region (North Africa), and offers design lessons from related initiatives around the world.JEL codes:F22, J24, O15

Immigration officials in rich countries are being asked to become overseas development officials, charged with preventing skilled workers from leaving poor countries, where their skills are needed. Some advocates urge restrictions or taxes on the emigration of doctors and engineers from developing countries. Others urge incentives to encourage skilled workers to remain or return home or policies to facilitate their interactions with home countries. Regulations often reflect compassionate and political sentiments without clear evidence that the regulations achieve the desired development goals and avoid pernicious side effects.

AbstractSkilled workers have a rising tendency to emigrate from developing countries, raising fears that their departure harms the poor. To mitigate such harm, researchers have proposed a variety of policies designed to tax or restrict high-skill migration. Those policies have been justified as Pigovian regulations to raise efficiency by internalizing externalities, and as non-Pigovian regulations grounded in equity or ethics. This paper challenges both sets of justifications, arguing that Pigovian regulations on skilled emigration are inefficient and non-Pigovian regulations are inequitable and unethical. It concludes by discussing a different class of policy intervention that, in contrast, has the potential to raise welfare.