Suchergebnisse

Soviet and East European documents provide significant revelations about the
interactions of North Korea and its allies. First, they show Pyongyang's
longstanding interest in obtaining nuclear technology and probably nuclear
weapons. Second, they reveal that North Korea's leadership consistently evaded
commitments to allies on nuclear matters—particularly constraints on its nuclear
ambitions or even the provision of information. Third, North Korea's words and
deeds evoked substantial concerns in Moscow and other communist capitals that
Pyongyang, if it obtained nuclear weapons, might use them to blackmail its
partners or risk provoking a nuclear war. When aid from the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics was not forthcoming, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
sought to bypass Moscow and obtain assistance from the Kremlin's East European
clients and, when that proved fruitless, from Pakistan. The absence of
international support reinforced the logic of self-reliance and "military first,"
pushing North Korea to pursue an independent line with respect to its nuclear
weapons. These patterns cannot be extrapolated in a linear way, but they surely
suggest reasons for caution by those hoping to engage North Korea in a grand
bargain.

As Communist rule weakened across East Central Europe and new governments emerged, the Baltic region differed from the Balkans in two ways that need to be explained. The first difference was the near absence of ethnic violence in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – compared to civil and cross-border war in most of the former Yugoslavia. The second contrast was the rapid consolidation of democracy and market economics in the Baltic countries compared to halting movements toward political and economic freedom in most Balkan polities.

This survey of books in English on North Korea, 1997–2007, identifies nearly 240 titles—mostly by US authors but also by authors in Australia, Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia. The books fall into eleven categories: history and culture; the Korean War revisited; the DPRK regime and its leaders; human rights and humanitarian issues; the economy: Juche, Songun, collapse, or reform; DPRK military assets and programs; relations with the United States; arms control negotiations and outcomes; regional and world security; prospects for North-South unification; and North Korea's future. A final section includes useful websites. This survey points to a wide interest in North Korea and underscores the serious and ongoing efforts of many scholars and policy analysts to understand developments there.

This essay seeks to spell out the lessons from East Europe, the former USSR, and China that may be relevant to North Korea -- lessons that could be useful for policy-makers and analysts in the DPRK as well as in the USA, the ROK, and other countries concerned about security and development in Northeast Asia. All the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the former USSR, and China changed due to internal reasons -- not from external pressures. The East German case, however, shows that internal pressures within the disenfranchised group of a divided people tend to accumulate and may explode if central controls weaken. When one government fears and dislikes another but cannot overthrow it, planners may seek to ignore, isolate, contain, or engage the target regime, while ignoring or isolating is the opposite of engaging, engagement can contribute to containment. This is a cardinal lesson of U.S. policy towards the former USSR and Communist China. Applied to North Korea, this lesson calls for engaging Pyongyang as a way to contain and, in time, help reform or transform the existing regime. Like the rulers of the People's Republic of China (PRC), those in Pyongyang wish to avoid the fate of erstwhile comrades in Moscow and other bygone citadels of Communist rule. For North Korea's leaders the East European and Soviet examples offer some hope: Engagement with the U.S. can improve living standards and buy time in which to reform an inefficient system. China's Communists have prospered and retained power even as they engage the capitalist world and foster economic liberalization. Optimal societal fitness, however, requires self-organization, not top-down control. If North Korea's leaders wish to save their system, they must embark on far-reaching economic and political reforms. China's example shows that market reforms are possible while retaining strong political controls. Top-down rule is not optimal for development, but may preserve the regime for some years. If the United States and the Republic of Korea seek arms control with North Korea and wish to promote peaceful change, then they should reexamine their policies towards Pyongyang. Neither an ultra-hard nor an ultra-soft approach works well in foreign affairs. Neither zero-sum nor win-win assumptions are wise. The lesson from U.S. dealings with the former USSR and present-day Communist China (as well as Libya in the past) can be summarized: If you can't overthrow a regime you dislike, engage it and work for positive change. Adapted from the source document.

Negotiations to control & perhaps eliminate North Korea' s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have foundered on many shoals. To what extent do cultural differences & negotiating styles obstruct mutual understanding & accord? One school of thought holds that professional diplomats transcend their parochial upbringing & communicate their thoughts quite well, even if they must use interpreters. The opposing school holds that culture matters: American diplomats favor a "low context," get-to-the-bottom line approach, while most Asians prefer a "high context" ambience in which "face" & personal relationships are important. This essay evaluates the evidence much of it contradictory -- about the weight of cultural factors in negotiations over North Korea & the bomb. It concludes that such factors have not been central but have often added to the force of other impediments to agreement. Given the current impasse in the negotiations, this essay asks whether both sides should not turn to a professional mediator to overcome the burden of distrust & hurt feelings, so that the objective interests of the parties could be reconciled & enhanced by a far-reaching accommodation. As former ROK prime minister Goh Kun has put it, Americans should remember that "you need empathy to resolve a dispute," while North Koreans should not "fear to negotiate.". References. Adapted from the source document.

Awareness that North Korea was developing nuclear arms prodded the United States to take measures in the mid-1990s that many observers hoped would dissuade Pyongyang from proceeding on that path. The George W. Bush administration, 2001 to 2004, broke from the course established in the Clinton years. To evaluate U.S. policies toward North Korea & weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the early 21st century, this essay reviews the hard-line negotiating principles espoused by the world's first Communist regime, the graduated reciprocity suggested by a former president of the American Psychological Association, Charles Osgood, & the hard-soft policy blend pursued by the Clinton administration. The evidence suggests that the Bush administration ignored not just the admonitions of political liberals but also the wisdom of Lenin's realpolitik & the potential utility of Bill Clinton's pragmatism. The upshot: The Bush White House permitted a serious danger to fester & probably helped to make it more serious. Why? The 43rd U.S. president (now the 44th) dislikes & distrusts Kim Jong II, but there may also be a political-military-economic explanation: A deal with North Korea on WMD would undercut the rationale for building a U.S. National Missile Defense, dear to the hearts & pocketbooks of many Bush supporters. 23 References. Adapted from the source document.