Suchergebnisse

1. Italian victualling systems in the early modern age: an overview and a critical assessment; Luca Clerici -- 2. Complexity and efficiency: Milan in the 17th and 18th centuries; Luciano Maffi and Luca Mocarelli -- 3. One city, two economic areas: wheat and olive oil trade in Bergamo between Venice and Milan; Fabrizio Costantini -- 4. Provisioning a medium-sized town in a polycentric state: Vicenza and Venice, 1516‒1629; Luca Clerici -- 5. Managing abundance: victualling offices and cereals merchants in 18th century Ferrara; Giulio Ongaro -- 6. The wealth of periphery? Food provisioning, merchants, and cereals in the Papal States: the case of the March of Ancona; Luca Andreoni and Marco Moroni -- 7. The Roman Annona and its market in the 18th century; Donatella Strangio -- 8. A two-sided kingdom: a Sicily of export and urban wheat supply; Ida Fazio.

The conventional understanding in the scholarly literature is that the main dimension that sets legislators' ideal points is the tension between the government and the opposition parties. In this article, I challenge this claim, demonstrating that this alignment is contingent on the level of party system nationalization. These consequences have not been fully documented. Using DW-NOMINATE to calculate Argentine legislators' ideal points (1983–2017), I show that individual territorialization in roll call voting increases when the party system is more decentralized. Legislators are closer to their provincial delegation, irrespective of which party they belong to, when there are low levels of party nationalization. At the individual level, this mechanism may be understood by the competing principals' theory: because party system decentralization implies a response to local dynamics over national dynamics, cross-pressured legislators may favor their subnational principal.