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Most African countries are in dire need of more tax revenue. In 28 out of 45 countries with a value-added tax (VAT), total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is around 15% or less, falling short of what is necessary to finance basic human and economic development. Far from being revenue-raising instruments, current African VATs are riddled with exemptions, exclusions, and zero rates on domestic goods and services that depress revenue, are highly distortionary, and greatly complicate the administration of VAT. This text enables policymakers, professionals, and students to analyse African tax systems to ascertain how they can be modernised. It explains the case for VAT base-broadening over rate-increasing, arguing that exemptions and zero rates mainly accrue benefits for higher-income groups.

This paper explores the taxation of corporations in the wider context of capital income taxation. The pros and cons of various income-based and cash-flow forms of corporation tax (CT) are discussed. The paper concludes that the dual income tax (DIT), which taxes all capital income at the proportional CT rate, is to be preferred over other forms of taxing capital income. The DIT is best attuned to the reality of capital mobility and is not held hostage by the higher tax on labour income. Levied at a uniform flat rate, the DIT minimizes opportunities for tax arbitrage.

Several African countries have to increase their tax revenues to finance human and economic development. General consumption taxes, such as VATs, are the preferred instrument for doing so, because they are less detrimental to growth than income taxes. To enable their use, VAT design has to be improved. Currently, many VATs are so riddled with exemptions and zero rates on domestic goods that they resemble extended excise tax systems, while the standard rate is mainly confined to luxury goods. VAT base-broadening would not only increase revenue, but also reduce the economic distortions and administrative complexities of most taxes.

Excise taxes on smoking, drinking, gambling, polluting, and driving are always topical and controversial. Not only are these taxes convenient sources of government revenue, they can also be designed to reflect the external costs that consumers or producers of excisable products impose on other people. Global warming, acid rain, traffic congestion, and the economic costs of cigarette and alcohol consumption are problems that can be corrected through selective excise taxes and otherregulatory instruments. Excise taxes, moreover, are increasingly looked upon as revenue substitutes for distortiona

It is widely agreed that in countries without major constraints on administrative capacity, a value-added tax (VAT) should tax all goods and services at a uniform rate. In these countries, VAT's C-efficiency, that is, actual revenue over potential revenue, should be one if compliance is perfect. Under this approach, VAT's C-inefficiency— the aggregate of the policy gap (exemptions, reduced rates, thresholds) and the compliance gap (revenue shortfalls due to laps in compliance and implementation)— is treated as a residual. This contribution shows that calculating VAT's C-inefficiency independently of its C-efficiency produces a more telling benchmark, particularly of the policy gap. This is illustrated by an analysis of the revenues of the Dutch VAT, which, given the common VAT directive, should be representative of the VATs in other European Union Member States. The large policy gap, hovering around 0.50, forms the background for exploring three options to improve VAT's performance: reforming the common directive, ceding VAT design to Member States, and introducing a common modern VAT which can be piggybacked by Member States. ; A preliminary draft of this paper was presented at the online congress of the International Institute of Public Finance held in Reykjavik, Iceland, August 23, 2020. ; http://link.springer.com/journal/10797 ; am2021 ; Economics

It is widely agreed that in countries without major constraints on administrative capacity, a value-added tax (VAT) should tax all goods and services at a uniform rate. In these countries, VAT's C-efficiency, that is, actual revenue over potential revenue, should be one if compliance is perfect. Under this approach, VAT's C-inefficiency—the aggregate of the policy gap (exemptions, reduced rates, thresholds) and the compliance gap (revenue shortfalls due to laps in compliance and implementation)—is treated as a residual. This contribution shows that calculating VAT's C-inefficiency independently of its C-efficiency produces a more telling benchmark, particularly of the policy gap. This is illustrated by an analysis of the revenues of the Dutch VAT, which, given the common VAT directive, should be representative of the VATs in other European Union Member States. The large policy gap, hovering around 0.50, forms the background for exploring three options to improve VAT's performance: reforming the common directive, ceding VAT design to Member States, and introducing a common modern VAT which can be piggybacked by Member States.

The harmonized European value-added tax (VAT) is anything but a modern consumption tax that taxes all goods and services at a uniform rate. As exemplified by an analysis of the Dutch version, some 60% of the base is exempted, that is, not taxed on output but on inputs. This has serious consequences. The VAT exemptions distort input choices, stimulate uneconomical self-supply, and complicate administration and compliance. The welfare costs of the exemptions can be estimated at one half of one percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Research shows that under an equal yield assumption, the elimination of the exemptions and the introduction of a single rate in conjunction with a reduction in the standard rate should foster economic growth. The Member States of the European Union (EU) should be allowed to replace their defective VATs with a modern version. This would strengthen competitive conditions.

Most governments will have to raise additional resources to deal with the aftermath of the corona crisis. This paper argues that excise duties on drinking, smoking, gambling, sugar-sweetened beverages, plastics, fossil fuels, motoring, telecoms and platforms are the preferred instruments. In nearly all cases, excise duties improve the efficient allocation of resources, while reliance on them is consistent with an equitable tax system. Also, excise duties can be administered more easily than income and value added taxes. Current excise duties are way below efficient levels. It should be possible to triple their yield, especially in developing countries.