Suchergebnisse
Filter
37 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
The performance of the pivotal-voter model in small-scale elections: evidence from Texas liquor referenda
In: NBER working paper series 10797
Power-hungry candidates, policy favors, and pareto improving campaign finance policy
In: Working paper series 9601
Voter turnout: theory and evidence from Texas liquor referenda
In: NBER working paper series 8720
"This paper uses data from Texas liquor referenda to explore a new approach to understanding voter turnout, inspired by the theoretical work of Harsanyi (1980) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2001). It presents a model based on this approach and structurally estimates it using the referendum data. It then compares the performance of the model with two alternative models of turnout. The results are encouraging: the structural estimation yields sensible parameter estimates and the model performs better than the two alternatives considered"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
SSRN
Working paper
Evaluating Durable Public Good Provision Using Housing Prices
In: NBER Working Paper No. w18767
SSRN
Property Taxation, Zoning, and Efficiency: A Dynamic Analysis
In: NBER Working Paper No. w17145
SSRN
Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy
In: American economic review, Band 94, Heft 3, S. 628-655
ISSN: 1944-7981
This paper argues that campaign finance policy, in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing, can be Pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters. The optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen.The argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions.
An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 110, Heft 463, S. 437-455
ISSN: 1468-0297
Preventing famine: Policies and prospects for Africa
In: Journal of development economics, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 227-230
ISSN: 0304-3878
Cash versus direct food relief
In: Journal of development economics, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 199-224
ISSN: 0304-3878
On the Dynamics of Community Development
In: NBER Working Paper No. w23674
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Pet Overpopulation: An Economic Analysis
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 10, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
The market for pets in the U.S. is important economically and socially. Pets differ from standard economic goods in significant ways, and the market displays a number of interesting problems, most notably pet overpopulation. Despite this, the market has been ignored by economists. This paper develops a dynamic model of the market for pets and uses it to study the problem of pet overpopulation. The positive predictions of the model square well with key features of the markets for dogs and cats in the U.S. The model is used to understand, from a welfare economic perspective, the sense in which there is overpopulation of pets and the underlying causes of the problem. The paper also employs the model to consider what policies might be implemented to deal with the problem. A calibrated example is developed to illustrate these corrective policies and quantify the potential welfare gains.
A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 1, S. 201-236
ISSN: 1944-7981
This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy. Policy choices are made by a legislature that can raise revenues via an income tax and by borrowing. Revenues can be used to finance a public good, whose value is stochastic, and pork-barrel spending. Policymaking cycles between a "business- as-usual" regime in which legislators bargain over pork, and a "responsible policymaking" regime in which policies maximize the collective good. Transitions between regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good. Equilibrium tax rates are too high, public good provision is too low, and debt levels are too high. (JEL D72, E62, H20, H50, H60)