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"All states must make decisions about how to regulate the treatment of animals. In this book, Alasdair Cochrane argues that this must go further. In order to ensure that their interests are taken seriously, it is imperative that we represent them throughout the political process - not only rights to protection, but also to democratic membership"--

Alasdair Cochrane provides an entirely new theory of animal rights grounded in their interests as sentient beings. He applies this theory to a whole range of different and under-explored policy areas, such as genetic engineering, pet-keeping, indigenous hunting, and religious slaughter. In contrast to other proponents of animal rights, Cochrane claims that the possession of rights by animals does not mean animals must never be owned or used by human beings. He claims that because most sentient animals are not autonomous agents, they have no intrinsic interest in liberty. As such, his book

Introduction -- Animals, interests, and rights -- Animal experimentation -- Animal agriculture -- Animals and genetic engineering -- Animal entertainment -- Animals and the environment -- Animals and cultural practices -- Conclusion

Proponents of justice for animals often argue that non-human animals have an interest in liberty. Furthermore, they usually claim that this animal interest in liberty is intrinsic rather than instrumental; that is to say, liberty is regarded to be good for animals in itself, irrespective of its contribution to the achievement of other goods, such as pleasure. For this reason they argue that legislating to improve welfare standards in zoos, circuses, laboratories and agriculture is inadequate. Instead, they claim that such practices are analogous to human slavery, necessarily harmful and must be abolished. In this article I refute this assertion and claim that for most animals, their interest in liberty can only ever be instrumental. In doing so I outline and reject two different arguments in favour of an intrinsic animal interest in liberty: first, that liberty is an intrinsic interest of animals because they possess preference autonomy; and second, that it is good for animals to be free, where freedom is defined as the ability to exercise one's natural functionings. I conclude that most animals do not possess an intrinsic interest in liberty because they are not autonomous in the relevant sense; that is, they cannot frame, revise and pursue their own conception of the good. If my conclusion is correct, this would have important effects on our obligations to non-human animals. I end the article by introducing some of these possible implications. Specifically, I propose that for most animals, our obligations do not consist of liberating them, and that it might be permissible to use and interfere with animals more often than other proponents of justice for animals have suggested. If this is the case, not all of the ways we keep and use animals need to be abolished. Nevertheless, many need to be reformed to improve welfare standards.

This paper explores the international implications of liberal theories which extend justice to sentient animals. In particular, it asks whether they imply that coercive military intervention in a state by external agents to prevent, halt or minimise violations of basic animal rights ('humane intervention') can be justified. In so doing, it employs Simon Caney's theory of humanitarian intervention and applies it to non-human animals. It argues that while humane intervention can be justified in principle using Caney's assumptions, justifying any particular intervention on behalf of animals is much more difficult – and in present circumstances impossible. If these claims are correct, a number of important conclusions follow. First, all states lack legitimacy because of the horrors that they inflict upon animals. As a result of this, all states are prima facie liable to intervention by external agents. To remedy this situation, all states have the responsibility to massively transform their relationship with non-human animals, and to build international institutions to oversee the proper protection of their most basic rights. ; Peer-reviewed ; Post-print