Constitutional law: the commerce clause
In: Turning point series
24 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Turning point series
In: Boston University Law Review, Band 99
SSRN
In: Iowa Law Review, Forthcoming
SSRN
In: Boston University Law Review, Band 97
SSRN
Does the Constitution limit the ability of a twice-before-elected President to serve as Vice-President? This question presents an intricate constitutional puzzle, the solution of which requires working through four separate sub-inquiries: Is a two-term President wholly ineligible for the vice-presidency? Is such a person barred from election to the vice-presidency even if that person remains appointable to that office? Is a twice-before-elected President, even if properly placed in the vice-presidency, incapable of succeeding to the presidency? And if such a succession occurs, must the resulting term of service as President expire after two years? This Article addresses each of these questions by exploring the implications of the decisive constitutional texts—Article II's enumeration of presidential qualifications, the Twelfth Amendment's treatment of qualifications for the vice-presidency, and the post-service limitations placed on two-term Presidents by the Twenty-Second Amendment. Some analysts have argued that the Constitution forecloses the possibility that a twice-before-elected President can hold (or at least secure election to) the vice-presidential office. However, the text and history of the relevant constitutional provisions point to the opposite conclusion: A twice-before-elected President may become Vice-President, either through appointment or through election, and thereafter succeed from that office to the presidency for the full remainder of the pending term.
BASE
In: Boston College Law Review, Forthcoming
SSRN
The U.S. Senate's handling of filibusters has changed dramatically in recent decades. As a result, the current sixty-vote requirement for invoking cloture of debate does not produce protracted speechmaking on the Senate floor, as did predecessors of this rule in earlier periods of our history. Rather, the upper chamber now functions under a "stealth filibuster" system that in practical effect requires action by a supermajority to pass proposed bills. This Article demonstrates why this system offends a constitutional mandate of legislative majoritarianism in light of well-established Framing-era understandings and governing substance-over-form principles of interpretation. Having established the presence of a constitutional violation, the Article turns to the subject of formulating a suitable remedy. As it shows, the Constitution does not require wholesale abandonment of supermajority voting rules in the upper chamber. Instead, the Senate might opt for more nuanced approaches that carry forward its tradition of extended deliberation and careful attentiveness to the views of minority blocs, while providing in the end for majoritarian decision making in keeping with the Constitution's commands.
BASE
In: George Washington Law Review, Band 82
SSRN
In: Boston College Law Review, Band 55, S. 39-92
SSRN
In: Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc, Band 67, S. 217-44
SSRN
In: Northwestern University Law Review, Band 106, S. 1091-1152
SSRN
In: Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, Band 107
SSRN
In: Fordham Law Review, Band 77, S. 2835-2891
SSRN
In: Ohio State Law Journal, Band 70, Heft 5, S. 1179-1214
SSRN
In: Advocate, p. 2, Fall 2007/Winter 2008
SSRN