Suchergebnisse

"Michael D. Cohen, a 20+ year veteran of working on, teaching, and writing about political campaigns, takes readers through how campaigns are organized, the state-of-the-art tools of the trade, and how some of the most interesting people in politics got their big breaks"--

Psychology, nuclear crises, and foreign policy -- The Soviet Union, 1956-1962 -- Pakistan, 1998-2002 -- Further tests : Kennedy, Vajpayee, Nixon, and Mao -- Conclusion : when proliferation causes peace

Michael D. Cohen argues that nuclear weapons acquisition often does dangerously embolden the acquiring state to undertake coercion and aggression, but that this behavior moderates over time as leaders learn the dangers and limitations of nuclear coercion

Does nuclear weapon development embolden national leaders to engage in more assertive foreign policies? Despite the importance of this question to international security studies, the nuclear emboldenment hypothesis has received little attention. This article develops a theoretical explanation of emboldenment grounded in social psychology and uses translated archival sources and secondary studies to test it on the cases of Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The results suggest that the dangers of nuclear emboldenment, while real, are substantially less than usually assumed. Biases associated with the availability heuristic cause leaders of new nuclear powers to authorize dangerous coercive policies in the short-term. However, the fear they experience at the nuclear brink causes them and their successors to authorize moderate policies in the longer-run. Findings achieved through case study analysis lead to the conclusion that nuclear proliferation is dangerous when leaders believe that nuclear coercion is safe, but becomes safe when they learn that nuclear coercion is dangerous.

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm by Cyert and March (1963) can be interpreted as a culmination of new intellectual directions in the study of organization that began with Herbert Simon's Administrative Behavior (1947). This essay shows how Simon broke with major pre–World War II intellectual traditions and thereby laid the groundwork on which A Behavioral Theory depends. It also suggests the contemporary potential of returning to themes that were set aside by Simon, but were key for prewar pragmatists, such as emphasizing the roles of habit and emotion in organizational action.

Early twentieth-century American pragmatists such as John Dewey placed a strong emphasis on the human faculties of habit and emotion. That contrasts with the emphasis in recent decades on cognitive processes. In contemporary organizational research there has been an increasing interest in recurring action patterns, such as routines and practices. The conceptual difficulties this work has encountered are usefully illuminated by Dewey's view of the primacy of habit and its interplay with emotion and cognition.