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Under socialism, Poland suffered massive environmental destruction. After socialism, Poland's environmental performance has improved remarkably. This book explains that system-specific institutions of socialism undermined environmental protection by creating regulatory conflicts of interest that led the Party/state to soften budget and law constraints on polluters. Those problems have diminished in post-Communist Poland as socialist legal, political and economic institutions have been replaced by liberal-democratic institutions and competitive markets. The analysis includes important implications for an institutional theory of environmental protection

Before the US can make progress on climate policy or environmental policy more generally, the new administration of President Joseph R. Biden must first undo the damage created by his predecessor in office, who dismantled existing US climate policy, pulled the US from the Paris Agreement, and sought to disable the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from regulating polluters. The courts blocked some of the Trump Administration's more egregious anti-environmental protection policies for violating the 1946 Administrative Procedures Act and/or the express terms of an environmental protection statute (such as the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act), but the Biden Administration still has a great deal of work to do. Already, Biden has announced that the US will rejoin the Paris Agreement as part of its plans not just to reinstate but to expand on climate policies adopted during the Obama Administration. This essay explains how the Biden Administration plans to achieve these climate policy goals, using mostly the very same administrative tools that the Trump Administration used to undo Obama era climate policies. Inter alia, advantages and disadvantages of pursuing policy goals administratively, rather than through legislative processes, will be addressed. ; Zanim Stany Zjednoczone będą w stanie zrobić postęp w dziedzinie polityki klimatycznej czy, mówiąc ogólniej, polityce środowiskowej, nowa administracja Josepha R. Bidena musi najpierw naprawić zniszczenia dokonane przez jego poprzednika na urzędzie prezydenckim, który rozmontował działającą do tej pory politykę klimatyczną USA, wyprowadził kraj z Porozumienia Paryskiego i rozpoczął proces odbierania Agencji Ochrony Środowiska (EPA) możliwości przeciwdziałania trucicielom. Sądy blokowały niektóre z bardziej jawnych antyśrodowiskowych polityk forsowanych przez Administrację Trumpa z uwagi na naruszenia Ustawy o Procedurach Administracyjnych z roku 1946 i/lub wyraźnych postanowień zawartych w statutach o ochronie środowiska (takich jak Ustawa od Czystym Powietrzu lub Ustawa o Czystej Wodzie), ale Administracja Bidena wciąż ma wiele pracy do wykonania w tej kwestii. Do tej pory Biden już ogłosił, że USA powrócą do Porozumienia Paryskiego, jako część swoich planów nie tylko odbudowania lecz także rozszerzenia polityki klimatycznej przyjętej wcześniej przez Administrację Obamy. Niniejszy esej wyjaśnia jak Administracja Bidena planuje osiągnąć cele polityki klimatycznej, stosując w większości te same narzędzia administracyjne jakie Administracja Trumpa wykorzystała ażeby zdemontować politykę klimatyczną z czasów prezydentury Obamy. Autorzy koncentrują się, między innymi, na zaletach i wadach jakie niesie ze sobą administracyjne realizowanie celów raczej niż omawiają procesy prawne typowe dla tego obszaru

AbstractElinor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework has been described as 'one of the most developed and sophisticated attempts to use institutional and stakeholder assessment in order to link theory and practice, analysis and policy'. But not all elements in the framework are sufficiently well developed. This paper focuses on one such element: the 'rules-in-use' (a.k.a. 'rules' or 'working rules'). Specifically, it begins a long-overdue conversation about relations between formal legal rules and 'working rules' by offering a tentative and very simple typology of relations. Type 1: Some formal legal rules equal or approximate the working rules; Type 2: Some legal rules plus (or emended by) widely held social norms equal or approximate the working rules; and Type 3: Some legal rules bear no evident relation to the working rules. Several examples, including some previously used by Ostrom, are provided to illustrate each of the three types, which can be conceived of as nodes or ranges along a continuum. The paper concludes with a call for empirical research, especially case studies and meta-analyses, to determine the relevant scope of each of these types of relations, and to provide data for furthering our understanding of how different types of rules, from various sources, function (or not) as institutions.

AbstractHodgson's (2015) critique of extra-legal 'property rights' – in this case, so-called 'economic property rights' – is right on target. This Comment contributes two further points to his critique. First, the notion of 'economic property rights' is based on what Gilbert Ryle (1949) referred to as a 'category mistake', conflating physical possession, which is a brute fact about the world, with the right or entitlement to possession, which is a social or institutional fact that cannot exist in the absence of some social contract, convention, covenant, or agreement. The very notion of a non-institutional 'right' is oxymoronic. Second, the fact that property is an institutional fact does not mean it must exist with the structure of a 'state' (as Bentham suggested). Rather, institutions like 'property rights' only require some community, however large or small, operating with what Searle (1995; 2005) calls collective intentionality and collective acceptance, according to shared 'rules of recognition' (Hart, 1997).