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An integrated analysis of the central issues in contemporary media policy. Chapters focus on technological change and its impact on cultural and political identities, the role of the cultural industries in the 'New Economy' and the impact of European integration on national institutions - public service broadcasting in particular. Because technological change in broadcasting has enabled us to open up media markets, the shape of media and of society has become more internationally-oriented. Indeed, modern international media has bought into question the very legitimacy of national communities and ideologies. And this is a phenomenon whose greatest impact has been in Europe. These studies address the future of public service broadcasting and the power of national regulators to shape trans-national media relationships. The author takes an empirical approach to analysis of these issues, exploring media and communication studies very much as a social science

On April 10, 2019, the International Tribunal of the Sea (ITLOS) gave judgment in the M/V "Norstar" (Panama v. Italy) case. This was the first time an international tribunal had ruled directly on the principle of freedom of navigation in international waters. Specifically, ITLOS found (by fifteen votes to seven) that by arresting and detaining the Panamanian-flagged M/V "Norstar", Italy had violated Article 87(1) of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In doing so, the Tribunal arguably relied on a quite expansive understanding of the exclusive flag state jurisdiction principle as set out in Article 92 UNCLOS—a point that was argued forcefully in a seven-judge dissenting opinion. Below, I will briefly outline the background to the case before setting out the central aspects of the judgment and considering further this point of contention surrounding the permissibility of nonflag prescriptive measures in international waters.

Abstract:The international rule of law is a somewhat ubiquitous concept yet, as idea, it is marred by ambiguity and disagreement and, as ideal, constantly frustrated by the institutional conditions of the decentralised international legal order. Rather than necessarily undermining the concept, however, I argue that these structural conditions cause a kind of conceptual rupture, resulting in seemingly opposed or contradictory idealisations. On the one hand, the international rule of law can be understood as what Terry Nardin has called the 'basis of association' in international relations. This understanding places importance on the legal form as an end in itself, whereby the structural or institutional autonomy of international law is critical to the peaceable conduct of international relations. On the other hand, however, the rule of law exists as an unfulfilled promise of an order to come: it is distinctly anti-formalist in nature, stressing the functional capacity of international law to actually constrain political actors (primarily states) and thus seeking to develop more effective international institutional mechanisms. Although these competing idealisations give rise to a certain contradiction and inherent tension, their conceptual opposition is, I believe, critical to an understanding of authority and accountability dynamics in an era of 'global governance'.

The practice of modern international law seems inherently bound up with the quest for a rule of law in international affairs. This commitment to the rule of law at the international level finds expression not merely in academic literature, but has been regularly endorsed by states themselves, particularly in the context of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the pursuit of an international rule of law is an ambition which is constantly frustrated. The institutional structure of the international legal order seems incompatible with this vision, resulting in a constant sense of frustration about the apparently 'primitive' or otherwise constitutionally deficient institutional structure of modern international law. In fact, despite the intensification of 'governance' through international institutions in the years since the end of the Second World War, it seems like the proliferation and growing normative authority of international institutions more often than not gives rise to more concerns from a rule of law perspective. In this article I not only seek to understand the nature of this rule of law commitment and the reasons for this constant frustration, but in doing so I will argue that the institutional context implicit in the ideal of the rule of law is incompatible with the nature and functioning of international law. I seek to show, in fact, how the perpetual sense of frustration felt in international law's failure to live up to this ideal stems from the fact that the rule of law is a notion which is implicitly bound up with the political context of sovereign authority within states. To attempt to impose the rule of law outside of this context will not only result in distortion and mischaracterisation, but runs the risk also of legitimising precisely the kind of arbitrary authority which is the main target of the rule of law itself.