In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 64, Heft 2, S. 362-376
This research examines the applicability of cognitive dissonance theory to explain a judge's decision to author or join a separate opinion. The author proposes that, when a judge casts a counterattitudinal vote, that judge will endeavor to reduce the aversive consequences of being viewed as an inconsistent decision maker by justifying his or her attitudinally incongruent vote choice to the public in a separate opinion. The author tests this possibility by examining U.S. Supreme Court justices' decisions to author or join concurring and dissenting opinions during the 1946 to 2001 terms. The empirical results provide qualified support for the use of separate opinions as dissonance reduction mechanisms, suggesting that dissonance theory both is applicable to the actions of elite decision makers and enjoys validity outside of a laboratory setting.
Disputes involving the boundaries of state versus federal power make up a substantial portion of the U.S. Supreme Court's docket and have undergone extensive analysis. Yet, the conventional wisdom regarding the justices' choices in these cases is that they are highly inconsistent. I argue that this is primarily a function of the failure of scholars to develop a comprehensive model of the justices' federalism decision making. To remedy this, I introduce an integrated model of the individual justices' choices in these cases, which is then subjected to empirical testing in the Rehnquist Court era (1986-2004). I explore a host of determinants of the justices' decision making, including attitudinal, institutional, legal, and personal attributes, as well as the role of organized interests in the Court. The findings reveal that the choices justices make in these cases are not as discordant as most commentators suggest. Rather, they are relatively predictable through the application of an integrated model of judicial choice. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 55-70
Despite the fact that amicus curiae participation is the most common method of interest group activity in the judicial arena, there is little consensus as to whether this means of participation influences the decision making of the U.S. Supreme Court. To redress this state of affairs, this research investigates the affect of amicus briefs on the ideological direction of the Court's decisions, with particular attention given to theoretical and methodological issues that have gone unexplored in previous studies. Analyzing group influence during the 1946 to 1995 terms, the results provide particularly robust evidence that pressure groups are effective in shaping the Court's policy outputs. These findings therefore indicate that elite decision makers can be influenced by persuasive argumentation presented by organized interests.
Theories of counteractive lobbying assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the advocacy efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of counteractive lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the merits. Testing the counteractive lobbying hypotheses from 1953 to 2001, we provide strong support for the contention that interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the nation's highest court. Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government, the Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in which organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy preferences into law.
Scholars have devoted a great deal of research to investigating the role and influence of the U.S. solicitor general (SG) as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court. Yet, we know little about the SG's decision to file an amicus brief and how this relates to the SG's success on the merits. We fill this void by examining legal, political, and administrative factors that affect the SG's decision to participate as amicus curiae. We subject our hypotheses to empirical testing using data on the 1953 to 1999 Supreme Court terms by linking the SG's decision to file an amicus brief to the SG's ultimate success on the merits, employing a Heckman-style selection model. We find that the SG's decision to file an amicus brief is influenced by legal, political, and administrative considerations, suggesting that the SG is best viewed through the incorporation of a variety of theoretical perspectives. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2008.]
Scholars have devoted a great deal of research to investigating the role and influence of the U.S. solicitor general (SG) as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court. Yet, we know little about the SG's decision to file an amicus brief and how this relates to the SG's success on the merits. We fill this void by examining legal, political, and administrative factors that affect the SG's decision to participate as amicus curiae. We subject our hypotheses to empirical testing using data on the 1953 to 1999 Supreme Court terms by linking the SG's decision to file an amicus brief to the SG's ultimate success on the merits, employing a Heckman-style selection model. We find that the SG's decision to file an amicus brief is influenced by legal, political, and administrative considerations, suggesting that the SG is best viewed through the incorporation of a variety of theoretical perspectives.
Despite the centrality of speeches to the American presidency, no research has specifically investigated the frequency of presidential public commentary about Supreme Court decisions. We do so and also examine why presidents discuss Supreme Court cases in their public comments from the Eisenhower to Obama administrations. Our empirical findings support our theoretical expectations in two primary ways. First, presidents speak most frequently after cases have been decided. Second, the monthly volume of presidential remarks on Court cases is shaped to varying degrees by presidents' desires to bolster their reelections, policy goals, and historical legacies. By shedding new light on why presidents comment publicly on Supreme Court cases, this research contributes to our understanding of presidential speechmaking, executive–judicial branch interactions, and how norms and institutions shape the behavior of political actors.
We contribute to the literature on political psychology, interest groups, and judicial decision making by examining whether ideology mediates the effect of amicus curiae briefs on decision making in the U.S. courts of appeals. Using an original data set, we find evidence that moderate and conservative judges are influenced by amicus briefs, but that liberal judges do not respond to these persuasion attempts. We conclude that this form of interest group lobbying influences judicial decision making by at least some judges and that understanding the efficacy of this interest group strategy requires an appreciation of how political actors process persuasive information.
In this research letter, we examine whether gender and racial bias affect interruption rates at one of the most visible events in American politics: US Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Using original data from 1939 to 2022, we find that male and white participants are more likely to interrupt women and person of color speakers, respectively, relative to male and white speakers. This finding holds for both senators and nominees as interrupters. Our results provide evidence that biased interruptive behavior occurs in even the most public and salient of political settings and that it can be mitigated (or intensified) by shared (or opposite) partisanship among speaking pairs. We also find interruption inequalities are not isolated to women as the interrupted, revealing that people of color in political and legal settings are subject to heightened rates of interruptions as well.