Suchergebnisse

The European Union (EU) has been attempting to promote stability in the Sahel since 2011 through capacity-building missions in the security and defence sectors. These policy instruments have been criticised for their limited effectiveness. To explain it, a common argument claims that 'local elites' lack ownership and political engagement. This article opposes such rationale and suggests that we need to rethink the agency of non-European actors beyond a Eurocentric conceptual toolbox ('resistance', 'fragility', 'ownership'). Building on an ethnography of the European capacity-building mission in support of security forces in Niger (EUCAP Sahel), this article shows that Nigerien elites regard the EU as an economic resource rather than a genuine security actor. Therefore, they primarily seek economic profits, material advantages, and professional opportunities from EU security policies. The argument proceeds in three steps. The first part intends to refine the broad category of 'local elites'. I suggest an inductive distinction that helps simplify our understanding of the agential practices of non-European actors. The second part uses this inductive distinction to foreground different strategies of Nigerien elites to make the most out of EU security policies. Third, the article discusses both the theoretical and policy implications of these empirical findings.

En juin 2021, le président Emmanuel Macron annonçait la transformation du dispositif engagé au Sahel. Alors que la situation sécuritaire peine à s'améliorer au Mali, au Burkina Faso et au Niger, la question de la soutenabilité de la présence militaire française est posée de plus en plus frontalement au sein des administrations et dans le champ académique. En revenant sur la manière dont ce débat a été investi par les acteurs institutionnels français (officiers, diplomates, administrateurs civils, représentants politiques), l'étude met en lumière la persistance de trois dilemmes qui structurent plus largement l'ensemble des réflexions sur la politique militaire française depuis les premières heures des indépendances.

Quelle langue parle-t-on au sein des institutions européennes ? Quels sont les facteurs qui conduisent des acteurs issus de contextes nationaux et culturels divers à s'accorder sur une langue de travail dans le cadre de leurs interactions professionnelles ? Quelle importance ce choix revêt-il pour eux et quels peuvent en être les effets ? Cette étude conteste la naturalité du choix des langues de travail au sein des institutions européennes et envisage ces arrangements particuliers comme un problème à expliquer. La démarche vise à repérer les enjeux politiques qui sous-tendent ces choix et les rapports de force internationaux et locaux dans lesquels ils s'inscrivent. Il s'agit de mettre en lumière les effets de l'usage de la langue française sur la morphologie de la mission d'appui aux forces de sécurité (EUCAP Sahel), et d'insister sur les logiques subversives et sur la contestation à bas bruit qui se jouent au siège, tout en montrant que les enjeux linguistiques peuvent également reconfigurer les rapports de force au niveau local.

N° 9 ; This paper capitalizes on EU-LISTCO's analytical framework to assess the preparedness of the European Union and Member States in addressing situations of limited statehood and contested orders in Mali. The first part of the working paper contextualizes the risks and challenges in Mali prior to the military coup which occurred in 2012. It identifies the fall of President Amadou Toumani Touré as the tipping point which led to the dramatic deterioration of the situation in Northern Mali. This part also unravels the components of resilience in Mali according to the typology suggested by Thomas Risse and Tanja Börzel (social trust, legitimacy of governance actors and institutional design). The second part focuses on the policies undertaken by the EU and three Member States (France, Germany, Italy). It shows that France, and to a lesser extent Germany, demonstrated a genuine capacity and willingness to engage in the crisis resolution process and foster resilience, even though some divergences have appeared. Other Member States, such as Italy, however, proved to be far less enthusiastic until the 2014 migration crisis which involved their national territory. The third part of the working paper identifies the persistent deficit of policy coordination and the existence of local rent-seeking mechanisms as spoiling factors which affect the efforts shown by EU and selected Member States to foster resilience in Mali.

N° 9 ; This paper capitalizes on EU-LISTCO's analytical framework to assess the preparedness of the European Union and Member States in addressing situations of limited statehood and contested orders in Mali. The first part of the working paper contextualizes the risks and challenges in Mali prior to the military coup which occurred in 2012. It identifies the fall of President Amadou Toumani Touré as the tipping point which led to the dramatic deterioration of the situation in Northern Mali. This part also unravels the components of resilience in Mali according to the typology suggested by Thomas Risse and Tanja Börzel (social trust, legitimacy of governance actors and institutional design). The second part focuses on the policies undertaken by the EU and three Member States (France, Germany, Italy). It shows that France, and to a lesser extent Germany, demonstrated a genuine capacity and willingness to engage in the crisis resolution process and foster resilience, even though some divergences have appeared. Other Member States, such as Italy, however, proved to be far less enthusiastic until the 2014 migration crisis which involved their national territory. The third part of the working paper identifies the persistent deficit of policy coordination and the existence of local rent-seeking mechanisms as spoiling factors which affect the efforts shown by EU and selected Member States to foster resilience in Mali.

This paper capitalizes on EU-LISTCO's analytical framework to assess the preparedness of the European Union and Member States in addressing situations of limited statehood and contested orders in Mali. The first part of the working paper contextualizes the risks and challenges in Mali prior to the military coup which occurred in 2012. It identifies the fall of President Amadou Toumani Touré as the tipping point which led to the dramatic deterioration of the situation in Northern Mali. This part also unravels the components of resilience in Mali according to the typology suggested by Thomas Risse and Tanja Börzel (social trust, legitimacy of governance actors and institutional design). The second part focuses on the policies undertaken by the EU and three Member States (France, Germany, Italy). It shows that France, and to a lesser extent Germany, demonstrated a genuine capacity and willingness to engage in the crisis resolution process and foster resilience, even though some divergences have appeared. Other Member States, such as Italy, however, proved to be far less enthusiastic until the 2014 migration crisis which involved their national territory. The third part of the working paper identifies the persistent deficit of policy coordination and the existence of local rent-seeking mechanisms as spoiling factors which affect the efforts shown by EU and selected Member States to foster resilience in Mali.