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"In this book, Josep M. Colomer argues, against much conventional wisdom, that political polarization is embedded in the constitutional design. The book puts forth that sustained conflict and institutional gridlock are not mainly questions of character, personalities or determined by socioeconomic or cultural inequalities. They are, above all, the result of the formula of separation of powers between the Presidency and Congress, which, together with a system of only two parties, fosters adversarial politics and polarization. Colomer contends that in the past, bipartisan cooperation and domestic peace flourished only under a foreign existential threat, such as during the Cold War. Once such a threat vanished, unsettled issues and new social concerns have broadened the public agenda and triggered again animosity and conflict. Constitutional Polarization offers innovative and relevant insights in political science to a broad readership without technical or academic jargon. It will be of high interest for those reader attentive to current affairs, as well as for public officers, journalists, pundits, and those in the study of political scientists, where it can also become a staple for courses in American Politics"--

Old troubles persist in modern Spain, including huge public debts, extensive corruption, widespread unlawfulness, oligarchical politics, territorial splits, and permanent protests and riots. The origins of these problems are remote: the ruinous Spanish Empire made a weak state, which built an incomplete nation, which sustains a minority democracy. "The Spanish Frustration" provides an interpretation of several important aspects of present-day Spain and its past stories.

This book reviews bureau-type organizations delivering network goods, documenting how most global institutions greatly improved their effectiveness during the last few decades. In the current globalized world, the design and choice of appropriate institutional rules and procedures can result in effective and democratic global government

This is a clear, comprehensive and authoritative introduction to the institutional regimes of countries in Western Europe written by an outstanding group of political scientists.

'Colomer's book is a stimulating read ... His most important argument is that global public services, such as security, a trading system, an international monetary regime, and communication networks provided by large democratic entities such as the United States and the European Union provide opportunities for small countries and regions to prosper.?? Sidney Weintraub, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, USA.

The leaders of the Independence in the Americas chose their institutios in a context of high territorial tensios, which moved tehm to create a potential anchor in the figure of a powerful central executive. Presidential regimes were endogenously shaped as elected monarchies by rulers who were army chiefs. The military-presidential nexus is not accidental, but constitutive and substantial. Some legacies of those choices include the frequency of military rulers as chief executives and long-standing attempts at life appointments or indefinite reelectios by incumbent presidents. ; Los líderes de la independencia en las Américas eligieron sus instituciones en un contexto de grandes tensiones territoriales, lo que los motivó a crear un ancla potencial en la figura de un poderoso ejecutivo central. Los regímenes presidenciales se moldearon endógenamente como monarquías electas por gobernantes que eran jefes del ejército. El nexo militar-presidencial no es accidental, sino constitutivo y sustancial. Algunos legados de esas opciones incluyen la frecuencia de gobernantes militares como jefes ejecutivos y los intentos de permanencia a largo plazo en nombramientos de por vida o reelecciones indefinidas de los presidentes en sus funciones.

Following an ambiguous constitutional compromise for democratization, the territorial decentralization of the Spanish state developed by means of political party competition, exchanges, and bargaining. Hence, the so-calledstate of autonomieswas characterized as "non-institutional federalism" [Colomer, Josep M. 1998. "The Spanish 'State of Autonomies': Non-institutional Federalism."West European Politics21 (4): 40–52]. In the most recent period, competition and instability have intensified. New developments include, on one side, attempts at recentralizating the state and, on the other side, demands and mobilizations forCatexit, that is, the independence of Catalonia from Spain, which resulted in sustained inter-territorial conflict. This article addresses these recent changes with a focus on the relations between the Spanish and the Catalan governments. The political changes were analyzed as a result of opportunities and incentives offered by a loose institutional framework and the subsequent competitive strategies of extreme party leaders.

"Politometrics: Quantitative Models of Political Institutions" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Empires Versus States" published on by Oxford University Press.

I identify some basic institutional features that can make a world assembly viable in terms of size and degree of complexity. The most potentially satisfactory model is a bicameral assembly formed by a lower chamber with about 2000 seats (of which about one-fourth would be elected in single-member districts and about three-fourths in multimember districts of proportional representation with moderate magnitude) and an upper chamber of territorial representation based on about 700 territorial units all across the world (basically corresponding to the nearly 200 currently independent states plus about 500 regional governments).