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Working paper
Corruption and Firms
In: https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/20334
We estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anti-corruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil over the period 2003-2014. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an increase in economic activity concentrated in sectors most dependent on government relationships. These effects spill over to nearby municipalities and are larger when the audits are covered by the media. Back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest that $1 away from corruption generates more than $3 in local value added. Using administrative matched employer-employee and firm-level datasets and novel face-to-face firm surveys we argue that corruption mostly acts as a barrier to entry, and by introducing costs and distortions on local government-dependent firms. The political misallocation of resources across firms plays a seemingly secondary role, indicating that at the local level most rents are captured by politicians and public officials rather than firms.
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Construction and public procurement in Uganda
As it transitions to an oil-producing country, Uganda's investments in infrastructure and physical capital will increasingly depend on the ability of the construction sector to respond to surges in demand and transform investment effort into outcomes. Using administrative and survey data, this paper sets out to examine the current bottlenecks to production faced by the construction sector in Uganda and identifies possible policy remedies to relieve them. A secondary point of emphasis in the paper's analysis is the interaction between government and construction firms through public procurement, and the instrumental role procurement plays in the efficient development of the industry.
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Investing with the Government: A Field Experiment in China
In: Journal of political economy, Band 132, Heft 1, S. 248-294
ISSN: 1537-534X
Investing with the Government: A Field Experiment in China
In: University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2022-79
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Investing with the Government: A Field Experiment in China
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Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations
In: American economic review, Band 110, Heft 10, S. 3071-3099
ISSN: 1944-7981
In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals. (JEL D72, D73, J45, O17)
What Predicts Corruption?
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Working paper
What predicts corruption?
In: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/19026
Using rich micro data from Brazil, we show that multiple popular machine learning models display extremely high levels of performance in predicting municipality-level corruption in public spending. Measures of private sector activity, financial development, and human capital are the strongest predictors of corruption, while public sector and political features play a secondary role. Our findings have implications for the design and cost-effectiveness of various anti-corruption policies.
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Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13697
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Working paper
Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations
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Working paper
Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations
In: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18526
In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public em- ployment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals.
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Working paper
Politics At Work
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Working paper
Politics at Work
In: University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2022-86
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