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The Antitrust Revolution of the early 1980s arose from various intellectual currents, including specifically the growing acceptance of modern game theory. Its greatest impact, however, lay in the development of revised standards for merger policy. From ones which employed largely a set of per se standards, they rapidly evolved into those more compatible with the Rule of Reason. Large horizontal mergers were routinely approved, and concentration levels in major industries sored. Although efficiency levels were sometimes enhanced, there is little evidence that consumers generally benefited in the form of lower prices. As a result, the new merger policy may have contributed to the observed growing inequality in U.S. distributions of income and wealth.

Retailing involves more than merely reselling products; it also provides product information to consumers. Product information can be offered by salespeople at conventional retailers and electronically by Internet retailers, or by a product's manufacturer through extensive advertising. Outcomes depend on who provides consumers with this information. This issue has strong implications for antitrust policy towards manufacturer-distributor relationships. The message of the recent Leegin decision was that vertical price restraints should be evaluated under the rule of reason. That message however is largely vacuous without more detail because it merely shifts the issue to what should be the criteria for different outcomes. I review here the antitrust case brought against Babies "R" Us, the leading retailer of various baby products. That case was the first application of the Leegin decision and suggests a path for future antitrust jurisprudence dealing with interactions between manufacturers and both conventional and Internet retailers.

There are two economics of resale price maintenance and other vertical restraints. In the first economics, the restraints are imposed by manufacturers on their distributors to achieve increased sales and higher profits, while in the second, restraints are coerced by large distributors, or collections of distributors, on their suppliers. This distinction is critical because restraints arising in the first context sometimes lead to enhanced consumer welfare, while restraints imposed in the second invariably lead to reduced competition and diminished consumer welfare. This article relies on this distinction to suggest appropriate antitrust standards toward resale price maintenance under the rule of reason mandated in the Leegin decision.

The practice of antitrust is not independent of the political environment in which it operates. This article examines the role of political forces in determining actual antitrust outcomes. Its focus is on the sources of support for this policy and the ways in which this support influences what in fact gets done. The FTC suit against Exxon and the other major petroleum companies is an example of the intervention of political forces in the antitrust process and this case is examined in some detail. Finally, this article draws some conclusions as to what can realistically be expected from antitrust policy.