Suchergebnisse

In this paper, the basis is explained on which economists argue for the use of price incentive systems (such as emissions taxation or the creation of a market in tradeable discharge permits) and against the use of regulatory control systems, specifying upper limits on discharges or process and equipment constraints, for the control of pollution. It is noted that practice of pollution control very rarely involves price incentives. It is argued that the question of why practice ignores the recommendation of economists is interesting and important. Some suggestions are made as to where the answer to the question might lie. It is shown that a price incentive system (the taxation of inputs to production which gives rise to polluting discharges) in which economists have shown rather little interest, retains some of the attractive properties of emissions taxation and avoids the need of the latter for the continuous monitoring of emissions, which need may be a factor working against the adoption of conventional price incentive systems for pollution control.