Suchergebnisse

We explore the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy credibility when both must be self-supporting. Our arguments are presented in the context of a two-country, two-period model of dynamic emission abatement with transboundary pollution, where government policies suffer from a time-consistency problem. In the absence of repeated interaction, any form of coordination - between governments, and between governments and their respective private sectors - improves policy making. Nevertheless, under repeated interaction international policy spillovers can make it possible to overcome the domestic credibility problem; and, conversely, the inability to precommit to policy domestically can help support international policy cooperation.

We employ a common agency model to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policy in two large countries that are linked through trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, when governments are not restricted in their ability to use trade barriers, environmental lobbying always results in higher pollution taxes relative to a no-lobbying scenario. Consequently, uncoordinated environmental policies are closer to the efficient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated policies. If, however, governments are bound by international trade rules, green lobbies may bias environmental policies downwards and environmental policy coordination is unambiguously efficiency-enhancing.

The dispute Argentina-Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods concerns a series of measures imposed by Argentine authorities on economic operators as a condition for obtaining import licenses. These measures were introduced with the goal of advancing the Argentine government's stated policies of re-industrialization, import substitution, and elimination of trade balance deficits. From a legal point of view, the least interesting feature of the dispute was the substantive compatibility of these measures with Article XI:1 GATT as they clearly constituted import restrictions. Identifying and classifying the measures involved, however, proved more challenging: based on vague policy guidelines, devoid of any legal basis, and consisting largely of wholly discretionary ad hoc action by the authorities, clouded in confidential obscurity, the measures escaped familiar categories and distinctions of WTO law. From an economic perspective, although Argentina's measures appear to have had no impact on its overall imports, they imposed large costs on foreign companies, as well as on Argentine importers and consumers.

The dispute in EC – Seal Products raises fundamental questions about the relationship between publicmorals and international trade. Can WTO members impose trade restrictions based on moral or ethicalconcerns? Under what conditions can these concerns trump existing trade liberalization commitments?The dispute was filed in 2009 by Canada and Norway against the EU, which in the same year had bannedseal products from being imported and placed on its market. According to the EU, the policy wasintroduced in response to European moral outrage at the inhumane killing of seals. The EU seal regimeincluded a series of exceptions. In particular, it allowed imports of seal products hunted by Inuit or otherindigenous communities, as well as imports of seal products processed and re-exported by EU producers.This article discusses the Appellate Body's ruling in EC – Seal Products and some of the key legal andeconomic issues raised by this dispute. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The EC – Seal Products dispute raises fundamental questions about the relationship between public morals and international trade. Can WTO members impose trade restrictions based on moral or ethical concerns? Under what conditions can these concerns trump existing trade liberalization commitments? The dispute was filed in 2009 by Canada and Norway against the EU, which in the same year had banned seal products from being imported and placed on its market. According to the EU, the policy was introduced in response to European moral outrage at the inhumane killing of seals. The EU seal regime included a series of exceptions. In particular, it allowed imports of seal products hunted by Inuit or other indigenous communities, as well as imports of seal products processed and re-exported by EU producers. This article discusses the Appellate Body's ruling in EC – Seal Products and some of the key legal and economic issues raised by this dispute.

AbstractWe examine how trade liberalization by a large trading partner affects the ability of a small country's government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism. Unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country's dynamic incentives. Liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement, in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same, unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country. However, if capacity in the import‐competing sector can be reduced only gradually, a conditional, reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions, where the large country liberalizes before the small country does.

This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely-lived policymakers. We also show that, when voting suffers from a recency bias, policymakers may have incentives to "collude" to get re-elected and term limits may help international cooperation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We explore the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy credibility when both must be self-supporting. Our arguments are presented in the context of a two-country, two-period model of dynamic emission abatement with transboundary pollution, where government policies suffer from a time-consistency problem. In the absence of repeated interaction, any form of coordination - between governments, and between governments and their respective private sectors - improves policy making. Nevertheless, under repeated interaction international policy spillovers can make it possible to overcome the domestic credibility problem; and, conversely, the inability to precommit to policy domestically can help support international policy cooperation.