Suchergebnisse

With over 30 million people moving to North America during the Age of Mass Migration (1850-1913), governments feared that Europe was losing its most talented workers. Using new data from Ireland in the early twentieth century, I provide evidence to the contrary, showing that the sons of farmers and illiterate men were more likely to emigrate than their literate and skilled counterparts. Emigration rates were highest in poorer farming communities with stronger migrant networks. I constructed these data using new name-based techniques to follow people over time and to measure chain migration from origin communities to the United States.

With more than 30 million people moving to North America during the Age of Mass Migration (1850–1913), governments feared that Europe was losing its most talented workers. Using new data from Ireland in the early twentieth century, I provide evidence to the contrary, showing that the sons of farmers and illiterate men were more likely to emigrate than their literate and skilled counterparts. Emigration rates were highest in poorer farming communities with stronger migrant networks. I constructed these data using new name-based techniques to follow people over time and to measure chain migration from origin communities to the United States.

Proponents of restrictive immigration policies often claim that families arriving with fewer skills and resources will struggle economically. This claim is challenging to test as lower-skilled migrants also tend to face greater discrimination, exclusion, and obstacles in the United States. I use unique multigenerational data on Irish Americans in the early-twentieth century, before and after migration, to directly study how the economic origins of Irish families and the reception context they faced in the United States affected economic attainment in the second generation. This analysis finds weak associations between economic background in Ireland and second-generation earnings in the United States. The schooling context and ethnic communities of settlement locations in the United States, in contrast, have strong effects on the second generation. These findings indicate that the experiences of immigrant families in the United States may be more important for second-generation attainment than the skills and resources brought from the origin country in the immigrant generation.

As over 30 million people moved to North America during the Age of Mass Migration (1850-1913), governments feared that Europe was being depleted of its most talented workers. I use new longitudinal data from the early twentieth century to study the geography and selectivity of migration from Ireland, the European country with the highest emigration rate. I find that Irish-speakers and the sons of farmers in poorer communities, where emigrant networks were strongest, were more likely to move to the United States. These results indicate that highly skilled workers were, in fact, underrepresented in the flow to America.

Der Beitrag analysiert das politische Engagement Jugendlicher in Europa. Der Beitrag setzt sich dabei mit der These auseinander, dass Jugendliche in Europa sich immer weniger in der konventionellen Politik engagieren. Die Autoren verweisen darauf, dass diese Aussage nicht für das politische Interesse Jugendlicher allgemein zutrifft. Der Fokus des Beitrags liegt auf Muster politischer Sozialisation, die das politische Engagement Jugendlicher fördern und die einen Ausgangspunkt für politische Partizipation bereitstellen. Die Analyse basiert auf Daten der ICC-Studie zur Bürgerbildung, die in 32 Staaten durchgeführt wurde (hauptsächlich in europäischen Ländern, in südamerikanischen Ländern und in einigen wenigen asiatischen Ländern). Der Beitrag erläutert die Operationalisierung des Konzepts und stellt anschließend die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung vor. (ICA2).

The Industrial Removal Office funded 39,000 Jewish households to leave enclave neighborhoods in New York City from 1900 to 1922. Compared to neighbors with the same baseline occupation, program participants earned 4 percent more ten years after relocation. These gains persisted to the next generation. Benefits increased with more years spent outside of an enclave. Participants were more likely to speak English, and married spouses with less Jewish names. More Jewishly-identified men (as measured by own names) were more likely to return to the city. We contextualize these results with new national evidence on Jewish economic and cultural assimilation.

Abstract
We document that children growing up in places left behind by today's economy experience lower levels of social mobility as adults. Using a longitudinal database that tracks over 20,000 places in the USA from 1980 to 2018, we identify two kinds of left behind places: the 'long-term left behind' that have struggled over long periods of history; and 'recently left-behind' places where conditions have deteriorated. Compared to children of similar baseline household income levels, we find that exposure to left behind places is associated with a 4-percentile reduction in adult income rank. Children fare considerably better when exposed to places where conditions are improving. These outcomes vary across prominent social and spatial categories and are compounded when nearby places are also experiencing hardship. Based on these findings, we argue that left behind places are having 'scarring effects' on children that could manifest long into the future, exacerbating the intergenerational challenges faced by low-income households and communities. Improvements in local economic conditions and outmigration to more prosperous places are, therefore, unlikely to be full remedies for the problems created by left behind places.