Suchergebnisse

Walter Connor shows how the seven decades since Stalin launched the First Five Year plan have changed Soviet workers from a disorganized mass of unskilled ex-peasants into something very much like a class--not the working class intended by Lenin and Stalin but a new and powerful ""accidental proletariat,"" produced by forces partly beyond the state's control. Does this new ""proletariat"" threaten glasnost and perestroika? To address that question, Connor examines the growth of the new ""class"" and its role in the crisis-ridden politics of Gorbachev's USSR. In this book, as in his earlier wo

Walter Connor shows how the seven decades since Stalin launched the First Five Year plan have changed Soviet workers from a disorganized mass of unskilled ex-peasants into something very much like a class--not the working class intended by Lenin and Stalin but a new and powerful ""accidental proletariat, "" produced by forces partly beyond the state's control. Does this new ""proletariat"" threaten glasnost and perestroika? To address that question, Connor examines the growth of the new ""class"" and its role in the crisis-ridden politics of Gorbachev's USSR. In this book, as in his earlier

Three recently published books on the dramatic events of 1968 in Europe, North America, and elsewhere provide a useful opportunity to look back at that year and ask what caused such passions. Violent protesters in the democratic West claimed to be acting on behalf of a wider cause, but most of them paid little heed to those in Czechoslovakia and Poland who were seeking to ease the oppressiveness of Communist rule. Newly available archival sources and the passage of more than four decades facilitate a reexamination of that momentous year, but many aspects of the events remain nearly as inscrutable today as they were at the time.

Three recently published books on the dramatic events of 1968 in Europe, North America, and elsewhere provide a useful opportunity to look back at that year and ask what caused such passions. Violent protesters in the democratic West claimed to be acting on behalf of a wider cause, but most of them paid little heed to those in Czechoslovakia and Poland who were seeking to ease the oppressiveness of Communist rule. Newly available archival sources and the passage of more than four decades facilitate a reexamination of that momentous year, but many aspects of the events remain nearly as inscrutable today as they were at the time. Adapted from the source document.

A rather consistent picture of Russian domestic politics and foreign policy in Putin's second presidential term emerges from the four works discussed. Elements of authoritarian rule, welcome or at least acceptable to large segments of a public weary of the political and economic disorder of Yeltsin's time, combine with Russia's growing energy-driven economic strength to provide a stable environment, and broad support for the regime. These strengths are expressed externally in a more assertive foreign policy, whose manifestations in both trade and security areas pose challenges for the US, and its EU and NATO allies.

Soviet society underwent profound changes during the seven-and-a-half decades of Soviet rule. By the late 1970s and 1980s, adverse economic and demographic trends had led to widespread public cynicism, especially among younger people. Mikhail Gorbachev was aware of the discontent within Soviet society when he came to office in 1985, and he pursued a reform program that was intended to remedy the country's ills and rejuvenate the society. In the end he failed. Although Soviet society did not "revolt" en masse against Gorbachev's reforms and the hardships that ensued, the crucial thing by 1991 was that the society as a whole no longer had much of a stake in the survival of the USSR—a stake that might have induced people to mobilize in favor of preserving a union.

Soviet society underwent profound changes during the seven-&-a-half decades of Soviet rule. By the late 1970s & 1980s, adverse economic & demographic trends had led to widespread public cynicism, especially among younger people. Mikhail Gorbachev was aware of the discontent within Soviet society when he came to office in 1985, & he pursued a reform program that was intended to remedy the country's ills & rejuvenate the society. In the end, he failed. Although Soviet society did not "revolt" en masse against Gorbachev's reforms & the hardships that ensued, the crucial thing by 1991 was that the society as a whole no longer had much of a stake in the survival of the USSR -- a stake that might have induced people to mobilize in favor of preserving a union. Adapted from the source document.

Examines the postcommunist worker experience in Russia in terms of the lingering effects of the Soviet legacy & efforts to escape it. At issue are labor-related economic facets of the Soviet system; the impact of Gorbachev's perestroika; & post-Soviet leadership labor relations. Seven economic legacies challenging Gorbachev are delineated, eg, state-fixed & -controlled retail prices, 100% job security, & rough egalitarianism in salaries/wages. How the postcommunist rulers approached these legacies are explored, identifying the fallout of the rapid marketization & the loss of the command economy. In this light, working-class (un)employment & wage data are marshaled to illustrate the impact of the Yeltsin government's apparently random preservation & abandonment of the legacies of the command economy. It is contended that while the Yeltsin economic team seemed ready to leave the Soviet past behind, it found itself unable to make a clean break; job security, controlled prices, & egalitarian wages are gone, & a weighting of the GDP apparatus toward services & away from manufacturing have displaced the notion of the classic worker from the working class, deemed perhaps the most pertinent break with the Soviet legacy. 1 Table. J. Zendejas