Governmental systems are deeply inscribed by processes of path dependence and lock-ins, yet they are also required to play a central role in both policy reform and institutional transformation. This paper offers an account of governance networks and posits a solution to the traditional problem of dynamic inertia in governmental institutions and thus provides the foundations for a theory of transformation. By first identifying network governance as a typology of institutional ensembles, the paper describes how the 'complementary configurations' of institutions may provide crucial pathways for change. Such networks are also identified as viable enabling structures for the learning, storage, and sharing of hidden alternatives to established institutional routines. The key to their success is identified in administrative rather than political authorization. Adapted from the source document.
Design involves an account of expertise which foregrounds implicit, heuristic skills. Most models of policy making have a stronger interest in structural and exogenous pressures on decision making. Research suggests that high‐level experts develop unique capacities to process data, read a situation, and see imaginative solutions. By linking some of the key attributes of a design model of decision making to an account of expertise, it is possible to formulate a stronger model of public policy design expertise. While other approaches often concern themselves with constraints and structural imperatives, a design approach has a focus upon the capacities of individual actors such as policy experts. Such an approach rests upon central propositions in regard to goal emergence, pattern recognition, anticipation, emotions engagement, fabulation, playfulness, and risk protection. These provide a starting point for further research and for the professional development of policy specialists.Related Articles Ralston, Shane. 2008. "." Politics & Policy 36 (): 1155. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2008.00157_11.x/abstract
Norman, Emma R., and Rafael Delfin. 2012. "." Politics & Policy 40 (): 369‐402. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00356.x/abstract
Sinclair, Thomas A. P. 2006. "." Politics & Policy 34 (): 481‐504. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2006.00025.x/abstract El diseño involucra un aspecto de la especialización que destaca habilidades heurísticas implícitas. La mayoría de los modelos para la elaboración de políticas tienen un fuerte interés en presiones estructurales y exógenas en la toma de decisiones. Un número de investigaciones sugieren que los expertos de alto nivel desarrollan capacidades únicas para procesar información, interpretar una situación, e idear soluciones imaginativas. Enlazando algunos de los atributos de un modelo de diseño para la toma de decisiones con un enfoque en la especialización es posible formular un modelo más fuerte de diseño de políticas públicas. Mientras otras perspectivas se enfocan en restricciones e imperativos estructurales, una perspectiva basada en el diseño se concentra en las capacidades individuales actores tales como expertos en legislación. Esta perspectiva se basa en proposiciones centrales que conciernen la emergencia de objetivos, el reconocimiento de patrones, la anticipación, compromiso de emociones, y la protección al riesgo. Estas proposiciones proveen de un punto de partida para futuras investigaciones y para el desarrollo profesional del los expertos en legislación.
In the standard works, accountability is defined as the legal obligation to respect the legitimate interests of others affected by decisions, programs, & interventions. This has usually meant that agencies obey those in the line of authority above them. However, the simplicity of this doctrine is often contradicted by the demands of contracting-out & output-based performance. Using interviews & surveys (n = 1164) of front-line officials in Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, & the UK, this study examines accountability as different forms of responsiveness, obligation, & willingness to communicate with others. It compares traditional vertical accountability with new forms of horizontal recognition. The research shows that there is a high degree of regime consistency across these two dimensions. Horizontal accountability is mostly a problem when it is accompanied by competition between public & private agencies in the same policy fields. 5 Tables, 41 References. Adapted from the source document.
In the standard works, accountability is defined as the legal obligation to respect the legitimate interests of others affected by decisions, programs, and interventions. This has usually meant that agencies obey those in the line of authority above them. However, the simplicity of this doctrine is often contradicted by the demands of contracting‐out and output‐based performance.Using interviews and surveys (n=1164) of front‐line officials in Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, this study examines accountability as different forms of responsiveness, obligation, and willingness to communicate with others. It compares traditional vertical accountability with new forms of horizontal recognition. The research shows that there is a high degree of regime consistency across these two dimensions. Horizontal accountability is mostly a problem when it is accompanied by competition between public and private agencies in the same policy fields.
Contemporary debates concerning the nature of "new governance" typically focus upon the shifting roles played by bureaucracies, networks & markets in the provision of public services (Kooiman 1993; Ormsby 1988). At the core of these recent changes we find a strong interest in having private agents deliver public services. Sometimes this is expressed as privatization & in other cases a "mixed economy" of public & private participation may be devised (Williamson 1975; Moe 1984). In this study, a number of central elements of neoliberal public management are brought together in a single focus on the "contract regime" to examine the extent to which single initiatives might combine to produce a recognizable system of governance. Such an institutional form may then be more carefully specified & its impact compared in different governmental systems. Using a four-country comparison of employment service reform, the study shows that distinctions based on degree of privatization do not adequately explain regime types, whereas distinctions based on "compliance-centered" or "client-centered" forms of contracting are more powerful. The type of reflexive interaction between different elements or levels of contracting also explains country differences. 1 Table, 28 References. Adapted from the source document.
