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The notion of 'representative democracy' seems unquestionably familiar today, but how did the Victorian era - the epoch when the modern democratic state was made - understand democracy, parliamentary representation, and diversity? In the famous nineteenth-century debates about representation and parliamentary reform, two interlocked ideals were of the greatest importance: descriptive representation, that the House of Commons 'mirror' the diversity that marked society, and deliberation within the legislative assembly. These ideals presented a major obstacle to the acceptance of a democratic suffrage, which it was widely feared would produce an unrepresentative and un-deliberative House of Commons. Here, Gregory Conti examines how the Victorians conceived the representative and deliberative functions of the House of Commons and what it meant for parliament to be the 'mirror of the nation'. Combining historical analysis and political theory, he analyses the fascinating nineteenth-century debates among contending schools of thought over the norms and institutions of deliberative representative government, and explores the consequences of recovering this debate.

In 1900, perhaps the greatest Victorian historian of ideas, Leslie Stephen, released his three-volume English Utilitarians. Coming to grips with the political thought of the century that had just ended, he believed, required considering the "dominant beliefs of the adherents of this school." So privileged a point of access was offered by what we would now call "classical utilitarianism" that a study of it could serve as a "sequel" to his previous History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. The utilitarians, Stephen was confident, could serve as a kind of synecdoche for a whole age. Further, if the utilitarians did not grasp the whole truth, there was no doubt that their "creed" would make up part of the "definitive system" that would arrive in due time.

This paper offers a new reading of the political thought of the mid-Victorian jurist and intellectual James Fitzjames Stephen. Contrary to impressions of Stephen as a conservative or religious authoritarian, this article recognizes the liberal character of Stephen's thought, and it argues that investigating Stephen's liberalism holds lessons for us today about the structure of liberal theory. Stephen, the paper demonstrates, articulated robustly both technocratic and pluralistic visions of politics. Perhaps more stridently than any Victorian, he put forward an argument for the necessity and legitimacy of expert rule against claims for popular government. Yet he also insisted on the plurality of perspectives on public affairs and on the ineluctable conflict between them. Because both of these facets existed in his work, he fit within the liberal ranks, but he did not show how the two dimensions fit together. The tension that we discover from reading Stephen is, the article concludes, not peculiar to him, but a permanent feature of liberal theories, which always include both technocratic and pluralistic elements.

Today political theorists and the public generally often associate descriptive representation with democracy. However, in Victorian Britain supporters of descriptive representation tended to be arrayed against democracy. The impression that democracy was incompatible with descriptive representation and a set of related values, primary among which was deliberation, formed one of the great obstacles which democratic theory faced in this period. These values belonged to a traditional theory of representation which held that Parliament ought to be a mirror of the nation in its diversity and which judged democracy, in contrast, to be an illiberal mode of regulating the franchise because it risked handing the representation wholly to one part or class within society. In response to this school of thought, democratic theory developed two conflicting responses: first, that democracy could accommodate social and ideological diversity; second, that democracy was irreconcilable with the goal of mirroring diversity, but that nevertheless democracy had to be preferred on grounds of fairness and non-arbitrariness.

According to Jeremy Waldron, John Locke's argument for the instrumental irrationality of persecution is fatally flawed. In this paper, I offer evidence that Waldron has misread Locke, and that Locke's views about why persecution generally proves inefficacious have greater plausibility than Waldron allowed. Locke's argument for the irrationality of intolerance does not, as has been thought, rest on a tendentious ontological distinction between 'the will' and 'the understanding', but on an account of the adverse psychological reaction of victims of persecution to their plight. Persecution, Locke argued, provokes in its victims feelings of distrust and hostility that diminishes the chances that they will convert to the religion that has persecuted them. An appeal to the 'victim's perspective' in order to dissuade would-be persecutors was a fundamental part of his case for toleration, and one that was noticed and employed by other proponents of toleration. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

According to Jeremy Waldron, John Locke's argument for the instrumental irrationality of persecution is fatally flawed. In this paper, I offer evidence that Waldron has misread Locke, and that Locke's views about why persecution generally proves inefficacious have greater plausibility than Waldron allowed. Locke's argument for the irrationality of intolerance does not, as has been thought, rest on a tendentious ontological distinction between 'the will' and 'the understanding', but on an account of the adverse psychological reaction of victims of persecution to their plight. Persecution, Locke argued, provokes in its victims feelings of distrust and hostility that diminishes the chances that they will convert to the religion that has persecuted them. An appeal to the 'victim's perspective' in order to dissuade would-be persecutors was a fundamental part of his case for toleration, and one that was noticed and employed by other proponents of toleration.