Suchergebnisse

To build effective missile defenses, the Pentagon must overcome the following: (1) bureaucratic inertia from 30-years of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty constraints that blocked even testing of the most effective defense concepts & (2) given that President Bush withdrew from the ABM Treaty last June 13, the collective amnesia within the Pentagon, which ignores Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) technical achievements of the Reagan-Bush I years. This amnesia results from the Clinton administration's purge of the most advanced SDI technology & its emphasis on making, at most, minor modifications to ground-based defenses permitted by the ABM Treaty, rather than investing in more effective US sea-, space-, & air-based defenses that could not even be tested under that Treaty. Such programs could be revived to field more effective defenses in the near future. 15 Figures, 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.

Favors deployment of a worldwide layered missile defense system by the US and possible withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia.

View that the US needs a strong defense system against missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction and should therefore withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which places restraints on defense systems building. In light of possession of missiles by China and Russia and the likelihood that they will make the material and technology needed for missile production available to other countries such as Iran; weapons of mass destruction include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

The government of North Korea has declared high-altitude EMP-capability to be a "strategic goal" and has also threatened an atmospheric test of a hydrogen bomb. Atmospheric nuclear tests have the potential to cripple satellites and the undersea cable networks critical to communication, and navigation necessary for trans-Pacific trade among the U.S., China, and other nations. When a nuclear warhead is detonated at high altitude, a series of electromagnetic pulses radiate downward within the line of sight of the blast. These pulses can disable equipment with miniature electronics and long conductors. Electric grid controls and transmission systems are especially vulnerable. Intense X-rays and free electrons caused by high-altitude nuclear tests can also disable satellites over large regions of space. After the 1962 Starfish Prime test of EMP effects by the U.S, numerous satellites failed. Based on past missile tests, calculated delivery ranges, EMP coverage areas, and geography, Resilient Societies developed five scenarios for North Korean atmospheric tests. Possible sites for EMP tests include the South Pacific Ocean northeast of French Polynesia, Johnson Atoll southwest of Hawaii, and vicinity of the U.S. territory of Guam. Missile trajectories for all three of these EMP test scenarios overfly populated areas. Missile navigation or nuclear device fuzing errors could place the populations of Japan, Guam, and Hawaii are at risk. All potential EMP test locations could cause disruption to international satellite and undersea cable communications networks. North Korea should not be permitted to conduct an atmospheric nuclear tests since EMP effects on large networks necessary for electric power and international data sharing could have serious worldwide consequences due to the importance of Asia and the Pacific region to the global economy. In the regrettable event that North Korea chooses to conduct atmospheric nuclear tests, U.S. and allied monitoring of EMP effects will be helpful.