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When the Cold War ended, many believed that expanding trade would usher in an era of peace. Yet today the United States finds itself confronting not just Russia in Europe but China in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. Shedding new light on how trade both reduces and increases the risks of international crisis, A World Safe for Commerce traces how, since the nation's founding, the United States has consistently moved from peace to conflict when the commerce needed for national security is under threat. Dale Copeland shows how commerce pushes the United States and its rivals to expand their spheres of influence for access to goods even as they worry about provoking a breakdown in trade relations that could spiral into military conflict. Taking readers from the wars with Britain in 1776 and 1812 to World War II and the Cold War, he describes how America's leaders have grappled with this inherent tension, and why they have shifted, sometimes dramatically, from peaceful, mutually beneficial policies to coercion and force in order to increase control over vital trade and prevent economic decline. A World Safe for Commerce reveals how trade competition could lead the United States and China into full-scale confrontation. But it also offers hope that both sides can work to improve their overall trade expectations and foster the confidence needed for long-term peace and stability.

"When seeking to understand why nations come into conflict, political scientists tend to focus either on threats to national security (realism) and or on moral duty, ideology, and domestic pressures (liberalism). Liberalism has been the major lens for international relations scholars analyzing the United States, due to the country's strong democratic foundations. In this expansive new book, Dale Copeland argues that the realist cast can shed fascinating light on American foreign policy--if one looks beyond security threats to consider economic threats as well. Copeland's "commercial approach to realism" establishes a new understanding of realism in three ways: by building out a new realist theory, by showing how this commercial approach applies to the United States, and by projecting this theory onto different scenarios that may arise in future conflicts between the United States and China."

Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale liberal-realist debate, Economic Interdependence and War lays out a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of conflict between nations. Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the Na

"Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale liberal-realist debate, Economic Interdependence and War lays out a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of conflict between nations. Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the Napoleonic and Crimean wars to the more recent Cold War crises, Dale Copeland demonstrates that when leaders have positive expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance long-term power. When, however, these expectations turn negative, leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and markets, giving them more incentive to initiate crises to protect their commercial interests. The theory of trade expectations holds important implications for the understanding of Sino-American relations since 1985 and for the direction these relations will likely take over the next two decades. Economic Interdependence and War offers sweeping new insights into historical and contemporary global politics and the actual nature of democratic versus economic peace"--

Economic Interdependence and War argues that dependent great powers may be inclined either toward peace or toward actions that can lead to war depending on whether their expectations of the future commercial environment are positive or negative. States that are optimistic about their ability to have access to raw materials, investment, and markets will be inclined toward moderate policies that build their long-term economic power and that avoid pushing other states into restrictive policies that set off destabilizing trade-security spirals (e.g., China 1985-2015). By contrast, great powers that believe others are cutting them off from access to trade and investment will fear a decline in their power and thus be more likely to initiate military policies that prevent this decline through increased control over economic spheres of influence (e.g., Japan 1930-41). Bridging the divide between liberalism and realism, the book thus seeks to show under what conditions economic interdependence can lead to changes in expectations of future commerce, and thus either to stable international systems or to ones that experience cold and hot wars.

I very much appreciate the opportunity to respond to three thoughtful critiques of the methodology of my book, Economic Interdependence and War. Timothy McKeown, Sherry Zaks, and Erik Gartzke offer important and constructive comments on the mixed-methods approach I adopted in the book. Adopting the positive spirit found in the critiques, I will not attempt a blow-by-blow rebuttal of their arguments, but rather seek to show how some of their insights can be used to advance the book's original intention—that of building a distinctive approach to mixed-methods research for the study of rare events in international relations (IR) and comparative politics (CP). The big take-away point from this essay is that there is no one best way to do social science research, even in a perfect situation where we have a great deal of evidence available for both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The right overall approach, and indeed the right balance or "mix" of quantitative and qualitative methods, depends fundamentally on the type of phenomenon one is trying to explain and the type of relationship between independent and dependent variables that one is considering. Once we get a handle on these elements, I will argue, many of the issues and concerns broached by McKeown, Zaks, Gartzke and other scholars about the role of qualitative research in the broader project of social science can be addressed and at least partially resolved.