Suchergebnisse

This article analyses the Juncker Commission's strategy to revitalize the legislative aspects of social Europe. Given the inherent obstacles to forging agreements in the field the Commission was required to operationalize a strategy of being a politicalising bricoleur: a bricoleur in the sense it revisited and revised existing tools with the aim of generating change and building an integration moment in social Europe; politicizing in the sense that the Commission exercised social acuity, built broad teams to mobilize for change, and deployed a distinctive discursive strategy. The analysis finds that the Commission had some success, but continued obstacles resulted in reforms being focused on revisions to relatively non-contentious policies rather than new legislative agreements. The analysis draws attention to the creativity of Commission agency and the constraints within which it operates.

This paper argues that EU structural policy administered through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) had a relatively limited impact in addressing competitiveness and productivity weaknesses in the English regions due to the emphasis on supply-side policies and deficiencies within the institutional framework for governing economic development. By analysing projects supported by the ERDF and the ESF in England from 2007 to 2013, we demonstrate that funding was used to shape self-organising networks of private and public sector actors, notably local councils, to encourage the development of entrepreneurship, research and development, the creative industries, transport services, and universities and educational providers. In the absence of an overarching strategic vision, and given long-standing socio-economic and political weaknesses, the effect of EU structural funding on the English regions was nonetheless marginal at best. Our case-study highlights that England's path-dependent and ungrounded statism combined with a neoliberal supply-side logic Structural Funds to create an empty signifier of regional development that failed to adequately respond to the structural needs of less affluent regions. Meanwhile, the post-Brexit approach to regional development, namely the levelling up agenda, represents a continuation of this empty signifier rather than a significant break with the past.

The focus of this article is on EU social policy-making since 2010 in the context of new governance arrangements and changing policy orientations and politics under the European Semester and Europe 2020. Analysis of these developments can tell us something very important about the consensus around social policy in the EU, and in the member states more broadly, given the potentially important role to be played by social policy in adjusting to the financial crisis. The last five years have been especially momentous in an EU context. The European Semester was introduced in 2011, inaugurating a significant new annual governance cycle to monitor and enforce compliance with stringent budgetary and structural reforms (European Commission, 2010). A key part of the Semester - and the strongest mechanism available to the EU institutions to influence social policy developments at member state level - is the issuing of Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) to member states in areas of perceived weakness. Europe 2020, the ten-year programme of economic, employment and social policy goals and priorities of the EU, introduced ten integrated guidelines to be taken forward by five headline targets and seven flagship initiatives. Social policy has an explicit place in Europe 2020, especially in terms of poverty and social inclusion, employment, pensions, health and social care. For example, one of the five targets aims to lift some 20 million people out of poverty and social exclusion by 2020.

Building on blame avoidance analysis, this article develops a method to assess the reactivity, sequencing and efficacy of defensive responses by officeholders facing a crisis of personal blame, analysing cases drawn from four advanced democracies. It tests the hypotheses that officeholders: react by positive action rather than non-engagement when blame levels are high; respond in a 'staged retreat' sequence; and can reduce the level of blame they face from one day to another through choice of presentational strategies. The article applies event history analysis to test the sequencing hypothesis and time series cross-sectional models to test the reactivity and efficacy hypotheses. The analysis shows that officeholders tend to respond actively when blame levels are high, that to some extent their responses tend to follow a staged retreat pattern, and their interventions have a systematic effect on the next day's media blame level only if they take the form of personal statements.